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THE ERROR THEORY OF CONTRACT 
MATTHEW A. SELIGMAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Many people have false beliefs about contract doctrine.  That 
pervasive phenomenon has profound practical, theoretical, and 
normative implications that neither courts nor scholars have rec-
ognized.  This Article will make three contributions to fill that gap.  
First, it will establish just how widespread the phenomenon is 
among non-lawyers.  After synthesizing the existing evidence of 
false beliefs about contract law, it will contribute a new empirical 
study showing that between one-third and one-half of people 
falsely believe specific performance rather than damages is the 
remedy for breach. 
 The Article will then argue that people’s false beliefs about con-
tract doctrine pose a fundamental challenge to prominent promise- 
and consent-based theories of contract, which serve as the princi-
pal theoretical alternative to law and economics theories of con-
tract.  Because people have false beliefs about aspects of contract 
doctrine that affect the value of the contract, the law enforces a 
bargain materially different from the one to which people thought 
they agreed.  For example, they pay a contract price they think 
purchases them a guarantee of performance, but the law ultimately 
provides them only with money damages for breach.  People thus 
did not actually promise or consent to the bargain the law enforces.  
For that reason, the normative justification for existing contract 
doctrine cannot be grounded in promise or consent. 
 Finally, the Article will explore the implications of that conclu-
sion for ongoing doctrinal disputes.  First, by removing promise or 
consent as a potential normative basis for contract doctrine, we 
may finally have grounds to settle long-standing disputes that ulti-
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mately depend on our choice of normative foundations about doc-
trines like consideration, mitigation, and unconscionability.  Sec-
ond, by failing to recognize the phenomenon of legal ignorance, 
the current debate about boilerplate misunderstood the problem it 
poses.  If people are ignorant of, and, therefore, do not consent to, 
both boilerplate contract terms and the background law that would 
apply if boilerplate were not enforced, then refusing to enforce 
boilerplate does not solve the problem of lack of consent—it simply 
moves it from a lack of consent to fine-print terms to a lack of con-
sent to gap-filling background law.  The problem of the lack of 
consent is, therefore, one that banning boilerplate cannot solve.  
Instead, reform should focus on the remaining problem that boil-
erplate is substantively biased in favor of the firms that draft it.  
The solution, then, may be to allow boilerplate, but to regulate its 
content to ensure it offers terms that are not too slanted in the 
firms’ favor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many people have false beliefs about contract law.  They falsely believe 
contract formation depends on the agreement being signed and in writing.1  
They falsely believe unlawful terms, like a lease term that requires a tenant 
rather than the landlord to perform maintenance on an apartment, are legally 
enforceable.2  They may falsely believe subjective rather than objective 
meanings of contract terms are legally binding.3  And, they falsely believe 
specific performance rather than damages is the standard remedy for breach 
of contract.4  Moreover, the phenomenon of false beliefs about contract doc-
trine is heterogeneous.  Not everyone has these false beliefs, and people who 
hold one such false belief sometimes do not hold others.  But the phenomenon 
is pervasive.  A substantial proportion of the population is mistaken about 
one or more of the major elements of contract doctrine.5 
Courts and scholars, with few exceptions,6 have largely ignored these 
pervasive patterns of false beliefs about contract law.7  Other areas of law, 
notably criminal law, have grappled with the potentially important implica-
tions of ignorance of law through their doctrines of mistake.8  Contract law, 
for its part, has well-developed doctrines to handle mistakes of fact but failed 
                                                          
 1.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 
67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1296, 1297 (2015); see infra Part I.A. 
 2.  Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Surprising Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence 
from the Residential Rental Market 38 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Dis-
cussion Paper No. 61, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782987 (an up-
dated version of this article was published in the Journal of Legal Analysis and a related piece is 
forthcoming in the Alabama Law Review); see also infra Section I.B.  See generally Charles A. 
Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127 (2009).   
 3.  See infra text accompanying note 44. 
 4.  See infra Section I.C. 
 5.  See infra Part I. 
 6.  See Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1 (providing the first empirical evidence of 
widespread false beliefs about contract formation). 
 7.  Id. at 1271 (“To date, there has been almost no investigation of when individuals act like 
contracting parties” who formed a legally binding agreement). 
 8.  For centuries, criminal law addressed how ignorance of the law should affect criminal lia-
bility by adopting the principle of ignorantia juris non excusat: ignorance of the law ordinarily does 
not excuse.  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41 (Boston, Little, Brown, 
and Company 1881); cf. Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law 
Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 729 (2012).  By contrast, courts have begun to 
excuse public officials’ ignorance of law in constitutional adjudication.  See, e.g., Heien v. North 
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (holding that a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment during a traffic stop where individualized suspicion depended on the officer’s reasonable but 
mistaken beliefs about the law).  See generally Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, The Triumph of 
Fault in Public Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2940016.  
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to address the problem of mistakes of law in a meaningful way.9  A constel-
lation of doctrines designed to account for mistakes of fact guide courts in 
deciding cases involving false beliefs about the facts underlying a con-
tract10—for example, in the classic case, whether a cow the buyer purchased 
was barren.11  But the courts’ treatment of mistake of law in contracts cases 
is limited to situations involving false beliefs about areas of law other than 
contract law—for example, where the parties were ignorant of the rule 
against perpetuities.12  In light of that limitation, contract doctrine does not 
concern itself with the question of whether the contracting parties know con-
tract law or not.  Scholarship on mistake in contract law mirrors that limita-
tion by focusing on mistakes of fact to the exclusion of mistakes of law.13  
Despite that neglect by courts and commentators, the phenomenon of legal 
ignorance about contract law has profound, if unrecognized, practical and 
theoretical implications. 
This Article will advance the error theory of contract to fill that gap.  
Similar to other error theories advanced in analytic philosophy, the error the-
ory of contract provides a conceptual framework for determining how wide-
spread false beliefs undermine prevailing justificatory theories of contract.14  
This Article’s target is one of the most prominent and intuitive theories of 
                                                          
 9.  See 27 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 70:123 (4th ed. 2003) (“There is no portion of the law of mistake more troublesome 
than that relating to mistake of law, by which is meant either ignorance of a rule or principle of law 
or an erroneous conclusion as to the operation of the law upon a known set of facts.”); id. § 70:125 
(“An overstated and legally common utterance, so often pompously pronounced, is that ignorance 
of the law is no excuse.  While that seat-of-the-pants admonition is apropos and should be limited 
to criminal behavior, in the civil arena, this is a hard saying, much maligned and regularly relaxed 
in equity.”). 
 10.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151–58 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 11.  Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887); see also Eric Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, 
Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 313–14 (1993). 
 12.  See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., 66 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996) 
(mistake about rule against perpetuities); Atchison v. City of Englewood, 568 P.2d 13 (Colo. 1977) 
(same); London Terrace Gardens, L.P. v. City of New York, 953 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2012) (mistake about rent control statute). 
 13.  See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (2003) 
(cataloguing types of mistakes in contract doctrine without considering mistakes of law); Rasmusen 
& Ayres, supra note 11. 
 14.  The philosophical literature offers error theories of analogous structure for a wide range of 
subject matters, most prominently morality.  See, e.g., RICHARD JOYCE, THE MYTH OF MORALITY 
9 (2001) (“An error theory, then, may be characterized as the position that holds that a discourse 
typically is used in an assertoric manner, but those assertions by and large fail to state truths.”); J. 
L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 35 (“[O]rdinary moral judgments include a 
claim to objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values in just the sense in which I am 
concerned to deny this.”) (1977); Matthew A. Seligman, The Moral Galilean Intuition: An Essay on 
Metaethics, Morals, and Colors 43–44 (May 20, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York 
University) (on file with author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307039 (ar-
guing that moral judgments are systematically false because their representational content is meta-
physically robust, akin to color perceptions).  
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contract law: the promise or consent theory of contract.15  According to the 
theory, often called the “autonomy” theory,16 the moral justification for the 
State holding people to contracts lies in their prior voluntary commitment to 
enter the agreement.17  The promise- or consent-based autonomy theory is 
deeply intuitive to many.  We must agree to enter a contract.  And, if that 
voluntary commitment to enter the contract is compromised, for example 
through coercion, we cannot justifiably be held to it—a contract made with a 
gun to your head is no contract at all.  The essential ingredient of contracts, 
what makes them different from other legal obligations, is their voluntary 
character.  For that reason, the promise- or consent-based autonomy theory 
serves as the primary theoretical alternative to the law and economics analy-
sis that otherwise dominates the discussion on the foundations of contract 
law.18 
This Article will seek to show that the autonomy theory fails as a justi-
fication of existing contract law.  To do so, this Article will establish three 
conclusions.  First, there is pervasive error, a fact supported by empirically 
confirmable, robustly observed patterns of false beliefs about contract doc-
trine among non-lawyers.  Second, pervasive error about contract doctrine 
undermines the viability of promise- and consent-based autonomy theories 
of contract in a wide range of cases.  Third, the failure of those theories of 
contract has significant implications for ongoing disputes about contract doc-
trine and the problem of boilerplate. 
This Article will proceed to those conclusions as follows.  Part I will 
synthesize and contribute to the growing body of empirical evidence that 
many people have false beliefs about the content of contract doctrine.  First, 
Section I.A will present the evidence of people’s widespread false beliefs 
about contract formation.  That evidence will show that people often think 
that a contract is formed when they formally sign the contract, rather than 
when (as contract doctrine holds) the parties manifest mutual assent.  Section 
I.B will then present the existing evidence that many people have false beliefs 
about whether particular invalid contract terms are legally enforceable, using 
the context of residential leases as an example. 
                                                          
 15.  Professors Charles Fried, Seana Shiffrin, Randy Barnett, and Jody Kraus are among the 
most prominent promise or consent theorists.  See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS 
PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory 
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and 
Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).  The differences between Barnett’s “consent” theory 
and the “promise” theories offered by other scholars is not important for the arguments in this Arti-
cle, and so I will treat them together. 
 16.  Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687–88 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
 17.  See sources cited supra note 15. 
 18.  Kraus, supra note 16, at 687–88.  
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Finally, Section I.C will report the results of a new empirical study re-
garding people’s beliefs about contract remedies.  The study surveyed a na-
tionally representative sample of 1,000 subjects about whether they believe 
specific performance or damages is the typical remedy for breach of contract.  
The results of the study, the first of its kind, will indicate that (1) a substantial 
portion of the population falsely believes specific performance is the standard 
remedy for breach and that (2) an additional significant portion is simply ig-
norant of the correct legal answer.  Moreover, the study’s results will show 
that meaningful inequalities in the distribution of false beliefs and ignorance 
about contract remedies across educational level, income level, and gender. 
Part II will then argue that widespread false beliefs and legal ignorance 
about contract doctrine poses a fundamental challenge to promise- and con-
sent-based autonomy theories of contract law.  Section II.A will present the 
core challenge to those theories: Under an autonomy theory, it is morally 
unjustifiable for the State to hold people to bargains with implied terms, sup-
plied by the law, about which they are critically mistaken.  Because people 
have false beliefs about the content of contract doctrine, they have false be-
liefs about implicit, legally-implied terms of the contract that they often find 
important to the value of the contract.  For example, when people falsely 
believe the remedy for breach is specific performance, they believe their con-
tract includes an implicit remedial term that differs importantly from the im-
plicit remedial term the law actually provides.  Contract doctrine thus en-
forces a bargain that is materially different from the one to which they 
thought they agreed: People pay a contract price they think purchases them a 
guarantee of performance, but the law ultimately provides them only with 
money damages.  As a result, the normative basis for contract doctrine cannot 
be grounded in the parties’ actual promise or consent—because many people, 
due to their false beliefs about contract doctrine, often do not actually consent 
to the terms of the bargain that contract doctrine enforces. 
Sections II.B and II.C will in turn argue that the two strategies adopted 
by promise and consent theories to justify default doctrinal rules falter in light 
of widespread false beliefs and ignorance about contract doctrine.  First, Pro-
fessor Randy Barnett’s consent-by-reference approach, which supposes that 
people give blanket consent to whatever rules the law imposes regardless of 
their content,19 fails because people do not give blanket consent to terms that 
contradict their affirmatively false beliefs about the law.  Second, Professor 
Charles Fried’s appeal to secondary norms aside from autonomy, like effi-
ciency or fairness,20 fails because in order to succeed, its appeal to secondary 
                                                          
 19.  See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 828–29 (1992). 
 20.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 60, 69.  
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norms would replace, not supplement, the autonomy norms that were sup-
posed to be the core of the theory.  Part II will, therefore, conclude that the 
promise- or consent-based autonomy theory fails to justify contract doctrine. 
Finally, Part III will explore the practical implications of that failure of 
promise- and consent-based autonomy theories for ongoing debates about 
contract doctrine.  Section III.A will argue that in light of pervasive false 
beliefs about important aspects of contract doctrine, the autonomy theory 
leads to the implication that vast numbers of contracts are voidable under the 
doctrine of unilateral mistake.  That implication is unpalatable because it 
would undermine the reliable system of commercial transactions the law of 
contract must serve to support.  For that reason, the proper move for the au-
tonomy theorist is to turn to other, second-best normative theories as a foun-
dation for contract law. 
Section III.B will suggest that this argument may in turn provide a new 
basis for making progress in the long-running debate between different nor-
mative foundations for the doctrinal rules of contract.  Those debates—most 
commonly between those who adopt an autonomy approach based on prom-
issory morality and those who adopt a law and economics consequentialist 
approach—typically amount to fundamental disagreements about normative 
first premises.  But if an autonomy theory cannot justify a workable system 
of contract, even on its own terms, then we may have no choice but to look 
to other norms to craft contract doctrine.  That, in turn, has far-reaching doc-
trinal implications.  Doctrines as diverse as consideration, mitigation, reme-
dies, unconscionability, and the objective requirement of assent all plausibly 
depend on whether we start out with a promise- or consent-based normative 
foundation, or a law and economics foundation.  The foundational failure of 
the autonomy theory might allow us to resolve those debates. 
Section III.C will then explore the implications of legal ignorance about 
contract doctrine for the problem of boilerplate.  One core problem with boil-
erplate, as several courts and scholars currently conceive it, is many people 
are ignorant of boilerplate terms and, therefore, do not consent to them.  That 
focus misses the real problem.  Because many people are also ignorant of the 
background contract doctrine that would apply in the absence of boilerplate 
terms, people are ignorant of, and, therefore, do not consent to, the relevant 
implicit or explicit terms either way.  The unique problem presented by boil-
erplate is thus neither knowledge nor consent, but rather that boilerplate typ-
ically offers terms that are substantively slanted in favor of the firms that draft 
them.  Once the actual problem comes into focus, we can see the crux of the 
solution is not to ban boilerplate, but to regulate its content so it is not so 
unfair.  Finally, because non-lawyers often use the text of their contracts—
even their boilerplate contracts—as reference tools to determine their legal 
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rights once a problem or dispute arises, it may even be beneficial to encour-
age well-regulated boilerplate to help to ameliorate the problem of legal ig-
norance after the fact. 
This Article’s conclusion will set the agenda going forward.  It first 
frames the theoretical questions about how a justificatory theory of contract 
law must respond to the error theory in order to salvage its normative ac-
counts of contract doctrine.  That path is challenging but well-trodden for the 
law and economics approach, which has in recent years adapted to other 
forms of bounded rationality developed by the behavioral law and economics 
movement.  But the challenge for an autonomy theory is more profound.  Fi-
nally, the conclusion will offer some preliminary remarks on how the error 
theory of contract might serve as a model for theoretical and practical ac-
counts of false legal belief and legal ignorance in other private law contexts, 
including tort, bankruptcy, and corporate law. 
I.  THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT CONTRACT 
DOCTRINE 
The growing body of empirical evidence regarding people’s beliefs 
about contract doctrine reveals a complicated factual landscape with contours 
of knowledge and ignorance.  This Part synthesizes the existing empirical 
evidence on false beliefs and legal ignorance about contract law and contrib-
utes a new study to the literature.  Sections I.A and I.B draw on empirical 
studies in the literature regarding people’s beliefs about contract formation 
and the enforceability of certain unlawful contract terms.  Section I.C pre-
sents the results of a new empirical study regarding people’s false beliefs 
about contract remedies.  In particular, the study tested whether people be-
lieve specific performance or damages is the remedy for breach of contract. 
A.  Formation 
Recent empirical studies show that many people have false beliefs about 
contract formation: They misunderstand what parties must do or say in order 
to form a legally binding contract.  Doctrinally, the law is clear on this ques-
tion: Parties form a contract through the manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange.21  In the typical case of a bilateral contract, such manifestations of 
                                                          
 21.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“An agreement is a 
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons.  A bargain is an agreement to 
exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”); 
HOLMES, JR., supra note 8, at 307 (“[T]he making of a contract does not depend on the state of the 
parties’ minds, it depends on their overt acts.”).  The formation of a contract also requires consid-
eration.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he formation 
of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange 
and a consideration.”).  In the studies discussed in this Part, consideration is always present, so the 
presence or lack of the manifestation of assent is the only relevant variable. 
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assent proceed through the communication of an offer followed by the com-
munication of an acceptance.22  Yet the formation of most actual contracts in 
the world is cluttered with other acts, statements, and thoughts by the parties, 
some of which may be legally relevant but many of which are not.  The em-
pirical question is whether laypeople—that is, non-lawyers—correctly iden-
tify the manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange as the genesis of a 
contract, as opposed to the myriad legally irrelevant factual details scattered 
about their contracting experiences. 
As part of a larger empirical project, Professors Tess Wilkinson-Ryan 
and David Hoffman conducted a series of studies that explored this question 
by presenting subjects with scenarios that temporally isolated the manifesta-
tion of assent that legally formed the contract from other, legally irrelevant 
events both before and after the moment of formation.23  Their first study 
examined people’s beliefs about when a contract is formed in a standard se-
quence of offer, acceptance, payment, and performance.24  They presented 
subjects with a vignette with five stages: (1) Pam posts a notice online that 
she wants to sell her car; (2) Doug responds to the notice saying he will buy 
the car for $2,000; (3) Pam replies “yes”; (4) Doug pays Pam; and (5) Pam 
gives Doug the car.25  They then asked subjects when Pam and Doug entered 
a “binding contract.”26  Only 24% correctly identified stage three as the mo-
ment when the contract was formed.  Moreover, the 76% with false beliefs 
about when the contract was formed were divided between those who thought 
                                                          
 22.  See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 94 (6th ed. 2009). 
 23.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1284. 
 24.  Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman recruited participants to their survey using Amazon Me-
chanical Turk.  The Amazon service operates by matching a “requester”—that is, someone who 
needs a task performed—with one or more “workers” who perform the task in exchange for a (usu-
ally quite small) fee.  That methodology is both increasingly popular among social scientists and 
increasingly the target of criticism.  Compare Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1281 
& n.67 (utilizing Amazon Mechanical Turk), and Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411 (2010) (defending methodology 
of using Amazon Mechanical Turk in social science), with Yanna Krupnikov & Adam Seth Levine, 
Cross-Sample Comparisons and External Validity, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL POL. SCI. 59, 65 (2014) 
(raising concerns about studies’ reliance on online subjects); John Bohannon, Psychologists Grow 
Increasingly Dependent on Online Research Subjects, SCI. (June 7, 2016, 2:30 PM), http://www.sci-
encemag.org/news/2016/06/psychologists-grow-increasingly-dependent-online-research-subjects 
(same), and Dan Kahan, Let’s Keep Discussing M-Turk Sample Validity, CULTURAL COGNITION 
PROJECT AT YALE L. SCH. (July 12, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.culturalcogni-
tion.net/blog/2013/7/12/lets-keep-discussing-m-turk-sample-validity.html (same).  Among the core 
concerns that critics levy against using Amazon Mechanical Turk in social science research is that 
the samples of participants are not representative—they differ demographically from the United 
States, and (as Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman recognize) any sample drawn from Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk is by definition limited to those who signed up for the service and decided to perform that 
particular task.  The study presented in Section I.C minimized those methodological concerns by 
working with a professional polling firm to build a nationally representative sample of the American 
adult population.  See infra note 85–86  
 25.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1284–85. 
 26.  Id. at 1284. 
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the contract was formed before Pam accepted Doug’s offer and those who 
thought it was not formed until after the acceptance: 51% falsely believed the 
contract was not formed until Doug paid Pam, and 18% falsely believed the 
contract was formed when Doug responded to Pam’s online notice.27 
 
TABLE 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman’s second study tested subjects’ beliefs 
about the role of formalities in contract formation.  They presented subjects 
with a vignette with four stages: (1) Tim, a contractor, presents a homeowner 
with a proposed written agreement; (2) the next day, the homeowner tells a 
friend she decided to hire Tim; (3) later that evening, the homeowner pri-
vately signs the paperwork Tim left with her; and (4) the following day, the 
homeowner calls Tim to tell him they have a deal.28  Only 28% of subjects 
correctly responded that the contract was not formed until stage four, when 
the homeowner communicated to Tim her acceptance of his offer.  Almost 
two-thirds (62%) believed the contract was formed when the homeowner 
signed the paperwork, even though she did so privately and without com-
municating that signature to Tim or anyone else until later.29 
  
                                                          
 27.  Id. at 1285. 
 28.  Id. at 1286. 
 29.  Id. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
True Belief False Belief
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT CONTRACT
FORMATION IN OFFER/ACCEPTANCE
SEQUENCE
Percentage of Respondents
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TABLE 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman’s third study tested people’s beliefs 
about the mailbox rule: At what point is a contract formed when one party 
mails their acceptance of an offer?  The vignette had four stages: (1) Janine, 
a homeowner, takes home a standard form contract drafted by Jayson, a con-
tractor; (2) Janine signs the contract privately at home; (3) Janine mails the 
signed contract to Jayson; and (4) Jayson receives the signed contract in the 
mail two days later.30  Only 9% of subjects correctly identified Janine mailing 
the signed contract as the point at which the contract was formed.31  Two-
thirds falsely believed the contract was formed when Janine privately signed 
the contract, and another 22% falsely believed the contract was not formed 
until Jayson received it.32 
  
                                                          
 30.  Id. at 1287. 
 31.  Id. at 1288. 
 32.  Id.  
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
True Belief False Belief
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT CONTRACT
FORMATION AND FORMALITIES
Percentage of Respondents
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TABLE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman’s results show that most people have 
false beliefs about the law of contract formation.33  They drew two primary 
conclusions from those results.  First, they concluded, “Most people have a 
sense that the law of contracts is one of formality.”34  As they noted, people 
seem to show “a startling level of interest in contract formalities, includ-
ing . . . an almost rigid refusal to acknowledge verbal agreements.”35  The 
widespread perception of the importance of formalities often focuses on the 
signature ritual: People “view their legal obligations as heavily dependent on 
formal manifestation of assent via signature.”36  That attention to ritual is a 
deeply ingrained cultural trope.37  For example, shaking hands to bind a 
                                                          
 33.  Id. at 1297 (“Lay views about acceptance appear to diverge from the legal rule.”).  Wil-
kinson-Ryan and Hoffman also conducted a fourth study exploring people’s beliefs about contract 
formation in a scenario where the parties agree with terms to follow.  Id. at 1288–89.  However, as 
they recognized, there is substantial disagreement among courts and commentators about when in 
such a sequence the contract becomes legally binding.  Id. at 1289 & n.76.  As a result, it serves as 
an uncertain example of legal ignorance. 
 34.  Id. at 1300. 
 35.  Id. at 1297. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  See Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 582–83 (1933) (“Cer-
emonies are the channels that the stream of social life creates by its ceaseless flow through the sands 
of human circumstance.  Psychologically, they are habits; socially, they are customary ways of do-
ing things; and ethically, they have . . . the normative power of the actual, that is, they control what 
we do by creating a standard of respectability or a pattern to which we feel bound to conform.”). 
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promise is a formal ritual that, for many people, still carries moral, social, 
and even legal significance.38 
Second, Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman concluded that these results, in 
conjunction with results in two separate studies,39 indicated that “subjects 
themselves draw a distinction between legal and moral obligations,” so their 
perceived “moral obligations are attendant both to legal formalism . . . and 
also to more fine-grained moral norms.”40  As a result, subjects will some-
times follow through on a deal they know is not yet legally binding in order 
to satisfy perceived social or moral norms based (perhaps) on promise, ex-
pectation, and fairness.41 
Two further observations about Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman’s results 
warrant mention.  First, their data show both that some people falsely believe 
a contract does exist when it has not (yet) been legally formed, and that some 
people falsely believe a contract does not exist even after it has been legally 
formed.  For example, in their first study, 18% of subjects falsely believed a 
contract was formed upon the buyer’s offer, prior to the seller’s acceptance, 
and 51% falsely believed a contract was not formed until the buyer paid for 
the car, well after the seller accepted his offer.42  We can call these two cate-
gories of false beliefs about formation “false positives” and “false negatives,” 
respectively.  As discussed in Part II, that distinction isolates different ways 
in which individuals’ false beliefs about contract formation disadvantage 
them. 
                                                          
 38.  See, e.g., Harold D. Hazeltine, The Formal Contract of Early English Law, 10 COLUM. L. 
REV. 608, 609 (1910) (“In its earliest history the Anglo-Saxon formal contract . . . viewed [the hand-
grasp] as sufficient to create a binding contractual obligation.”).  Consider also that we still talk of 
“sealing the deal”—a metaphor which itself harkens to medieval procedure that used wax seals to 
certify documents.  3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 169 (Profes-
sional Books Ltd. 1985) (1628) (“It is required, that the deed, charter, or writing must be sealed; 
that is, have some impression upon the wax, for sigillum est cera impressa, quia cera sine impres-
sione non est silligum . . . .”); Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of A Promise Under Seal As A 
Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617, 631 n.46 (1993) (citing Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 
239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) and translating Coke’s statement as “[i]mpressed wax is the signature and, 
without the impression of wax, there is no signature”); see also Bank of the United States v. Dan-
dridge, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 64, 67 (1827) (“In ancient times it was held, that corporations aggregate 
could do nothing but by deed under their common seal.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 158 (1803) (“The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission; and the 
great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is complete.  It attests, by an act supposed to 
be of public notoriety, the verity of the Presidential signature.”); Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446, 451 
(N.J. 1878) (“If a party has fully and absolutely expressed his intention in a writing sealed and 
delivered, with the most solemn sanction known to our law, what should prevent its execution where 
there is no fraud or illegality?”). 
 39.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1290–95 (presenting results of studies ex-
ploring whether subjects are more likely to perform even when (1) they know they are not legally 
bound and (2) their counterparty invested in reliance on a contract that is not yet legally binding). 
 40.  Id. at 1297 (emphasis omitted). 
 41.  Id. at 1271. 
 42.  Id. at 1285. 
 160 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:147 
Second, people’s focus on contract formalities like signatures, even 
when performed privately, raises the intriguing possibility that what drives 
these results is an underlying belief that the real, legally relevant fact is sub-
jective assent.43  Although a physical ritual like a signature is quintessentially 
objective, the studies discussed here suggest that the ritual matters even when 
performed privately.  What accompanies that private ritual, almost invaria-
bly, is the moment of subjective assent.44  If people falsely believe subjective 
assent is the critical ingredient to contract formation, then they may well also 
believe subjective meanings of contract terms govern because both beliefs 
arise from the (doctrinally mistaken) idea that the normative basis of contract 
is subjective commitment.  That latter belief would, too, be false45 and could 
have profound practical and normative implications.46  In light of those po-
tential consequences, people’s attitudes about subjective assent and the role 
of subjective meanings in contract interpretation warrants further empirical 
research. 
B.  Enforceability 
Many people also falsely believe certain sorts of contract terms are le-
gally enforceable when, as a matter of law, they are not.  Both at common 
                                                          
 43.  Contracts professors may recognize the widespread belief that subjective assent is legally 
controlling in their first-year students’ reactions to the casebook staple, Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 
516 (Va. 1954).  Zehmer claimed, though he signed a written agreement to sell his farm to Lucy, 
“the whole matter was a joke,” he “was high as a Georgia pine,” and the putative sale “was just a 
bunch of two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most.”  Id. at 
518, 520.  The court rejected that “unusual, if not bizarre, defense.”  Id. at 520.  Many students find 
jarring the court’s conclusions that “[t]he mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the for-
mation of a contract,” and, accordingly, the contract was enforceable even if Zehmer was “merely 
jesting.”  Id. at 522.  If first-year law students find that result counterintuitive, it is plausible the 
general population of non-lawyers would as well. 
 44.  And, if someone performed the ritual privately but without subjective assent—say, per-
haps, she privately signed a form contract as a joke—one doubts that most people would consider 
the contract formed and legally binding. 
 45.  See Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“A contract 
is an obligation attached by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops 
that either party, when he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning which 
the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or some-
thing else of the sort.” (emphasis added)); PERILLO, supra note 22, at 24 (“A party’s intention will 
be held to be what a reasonable person in the position of the other party would conclude the mani-
festation to mean.”). But cf. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 375, 376; 2 H. & C. 
906, 906, 908 (per curiam) (suggesting parties’ differing subjective meanings of “Peerless,” which 
was the name of two different ships carrying cotton from Bombay, defeated the formation of a 
contract due to mutual mistake); see also HOLMES, JR., supra note 8, at 309 (attempting to reconcile 
Raffles with the objective approach to contract); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of 
Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1123 (1984) (criticizing Holmes’ attempt as “precisely back-
ward”). 
 46.  In short, the problem would be that contract doctrine would hold people to bargains with 
terms that differed from the terms that people thought they were agreeing to.  That concern echoes 
the problem raised by false beliefs about contract remedies.  See infra Part II. 
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law and by statute, the law forbids the enforcement of terms that violate pub-
lic policy.47  Usury laws are among the most prominent historical examples 
of such prohibitions in the United States.  Prior to Independence, most of the 
Colonies enforced usury laws that prohibited creditors from charging a rate 
of interest exceeding the legal maximum.48  The effect of such laws was to 
make the interest term of a loan contract unenforceable if the rate was too 
high.  National financial institutions are largely exempt from usury laws,49 
and local institutions like pawn shops are regulated by a “complex hodge-
podge of laws that states use to regulate interest rates.”50 
                                                          
 47.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A prom-
ise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides 
that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances 
by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.”). 
 48.  See Hugh Rockoff, Prodigals and Projectors: An Economic History of Usury Laws in the 
United States from Colonial Times to 1900 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 9742, 
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9742.pdf.  Massachusetts, for example, set a maximum inter-
est rate of 8% in 1641, which it lowered to 6% in 1693, before repealing the usury law entirely in 
1867.  Id. at 19.  Usury laws, of course, long pre-dated Colonial America: Both ancient Rome and 
ancient India had usury laws, id. at 1, and the Old Testament of the Bible prohibited charging inter-
est, see Exodus 22:24 (“If thou lend money to any of My people, even to the poor with thee, thou 
shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest.”); Leviticus 25:36 (“Take 
thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.”).  Indeed, 
the modern field of Islamic finance reflects the interplay between modern economic demands for 
capital with the adherence to formal religious prohibitions on charging interest.  See MAHMOUD A. 
EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE 20, 25 (2006) (describing 
“Shari’a arbitrage” by which the practice of Islamic finance identifies financial products “deemed 
contrary to the percepts of Islamic Law” and then reverse-engineers a Shari’a-compliant analogue 
that abides by Shari’a law’s formal prohibitions).  That long historical and cultural experience with 
legally invalid contract terms suggests a complex interaction between social customs, folk moral 
beliefs, and popular beliefs about what the law permits and requires. 
 49.  The Supreme Court held in 1978 that the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976), pre-
empted the application of state usury laws to nationally-chartered banks located in other states.  
Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 318 (1978).  As 
a result, most national banks relocated their credit-card operations to states like South Dakota that 
had extremely high or no interest rate caps.  See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit 
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 70 & n.227 (2008).  The Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.), then exempted federally chartered savings banks and other institutions from 
state usury laws, rendering them effectively pre-empted.  See id. §§ 501–529, 94 Stat. at 161–68. 
 50.  Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
283, 301 (1995).  
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Beyond interest rates, modern statutory, regulatory, and common law 
regulates the substantive content of contract terms in a wide variety of con-
texts, including employment law,51 landlord-tenant law,52 consumer finance 
law,53 and others.54  Notwithstanding these clear prohibitions, many contracts 
continue to include unlawful terms.55  As several commentators observed, 
“[T]he obvious reason why one party would seek a clause it knew to be un-
enforceable is that it believed the other party to be unaware of the fact and 
likely to remain unaware of it.”56 
Recent empirical research supports that hypothesis in the context of 
lease contracts.  Meirav Furth-Matzkin conducted an empirical study on res-
idential leases in the Boston area.57  Her research first replicated prior results 
showing the prevalence of unlawful terms in standard contracts.58  She re-
viewed seventy residential leases and found that sixty-nine (or 99% of the 
                                                          
 51.  For example, most jurisdictions hold that non-compete clauses in employment contracts 
are unenforceable if they are overly broad in duration, geography, or practical scope.  See, e.g., 
RLM Commc’ns, Inc. v. Tuschen, 831 F.3d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a covenant not 
to compete is valid under North Carolina law “only if [it is] ‘(1) in writing; (2) made a part of the 
employment contract; (3) based on valuable consideration; (4) reasonable as to time and territory; 
and (5) designed to protect a legitimate business interest of the employer’” and “must be no wider 
in scope than is necessary to protect the business of the employer” (emphasis added) (first quoting 
Farr Assocs., Inc. v. Baskin, 530 S.E.2d 878, 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); and then quoting Manpower 
of Guilford Cty., Inc. v. Hedgecock, 257 S.E.2d 109, 114 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979))); see also Sullivan, 
supra note 2, at 1129 (discussing various types of unenforceable clauses employers frequently insert 
in employment contracts). 
 52.  The provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (“URLTA”), which 
twenty-one states adopted in whole and others in part, prohibit a wide range of lease terms.  See 
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 203 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAW 2015); see also Furth-Matzkin, supra note 2, at 5 (“During the 1960’s and 1970’s, 
the United States has experienced a revolution in Landlord and Tenant Law: the vast majority of 
states have adopted regulation armoring tenants with a variety of mandatory rights and remedies 
that cannot be disclaimed under any lease agreement.”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-24, §§ 163, 171, 123 Stat. 1734, 1736–37, 1742 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1666b, 1666i–1 (2012)) (banning certain terms from credit card agreements, including those re-
quiring payment sooner than twenty-one days after a bill is mailed and those that retroactively in-
crease interest rates). 
 54.  Invalid forum-selection clauses, excessive liquidated damages clauses that rise to the level 
of penalty clauses, and void waivers of prospective liability or unwaivable statutory rights may arise 
in almost any contractual context.  See Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1130. 
 55.  See id. at 1128 (“Contracts frequently contain clauses that are not enforceable—at least, 
not enforceable as written.” (footnote omitted)); Curtis J. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791–92 (1974) (finding residential form leases continued to contain unen-
forceable clauses even though landlords lost most cases in which such clauses were litigated). 
 56.  Sullivan, supra note 2, at 1136; see also Furth-Matzkin, supra note 2, at 3–4; Bailey 
Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 
845 (1988).  There are at least two other theoretically plausible explanations: the drafter hopes for 
a change in the law, or the sophisticated drafter was itself ignorant of the legal rule. 
 57.  Furth-Matzkin, supra note 2, at 5–6. 
 58.  Id.  
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total) included at least one “misleading” or outright unenforceable clause.59  
Furth-Matzkin defined a “misleading clause” as one which “misstate[s] the 
law by selectively disclosing only a particular part of it—namely, the tenant’s 
duties or the landlord’s rights and remedies,” as opposed to “unenforceable 
[clauses which] misstate the law by contravening it outright.”60  Both types 
of clauses are relevant to the problem of legal ignorance, because as she 
noted, “both unenforceable and misleading terms are equally likely to gener-
ate [tenants’] misconceptions about the applicable legal framework.”61 
Furth-Matzkin’s study “reveals that residential leases often contain un-
enforceable and misleading clauses, and systematically fail to disclose the 
vast majority of the tenant’s rights and remedies.”62 Of the seventy total 
leases, fifty-one (or 73% of the total) contained at least one unenforceable 
clause, sixty-five (or 93% of the total) contained at least one misleading 
clause, and forty-seven (or 67% of the total) contained at least one clause of 
both types.63  The seventy leases contained on average eight clauses regulated 
by local landlord and tenant law, of which an average of 1.39 clauses (or 
17.38%) were unenforceable and 1.59 clauses (or 19.88%) were mislead-
ing.64  For this sample of leases, the prevalence of unenforceable terms is, 
therefore, considerable: Almost 40% of the lease terms regulated by landlord 
and tenant law contravened it.65 
The second stage of Furth-Matzkin’s study tested whether people are 
likely to have false beliefs about their legal rights due to misleading and un-
enforceable clauses.66  She surveyed 279 resident tenants living in Massa-
chusetts, presenting them with a two-part questionnaire.67  The first part of 
the questionnaire asked them whether they had experienced any problem 
(like a maintenance issue) as a renter, and, if so, how the issue was ad-
dressed.68  In particular, this part of the questionnaire sought to determine 
whether renters look at their leases in order to determine their legal rights 
when a problem arises.69  That question matters because people’s false beliefs 
about the legal validity of the terms of their leases are irrelevant if they never 
read them—and it is well-established that few people read lengthy boilerplate 
                                                          
 59.  Id. at 27. 
 60.  Id. at 16.   
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. at 27. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. Because Furth-Matzkin’s definitions of “misleading” and “unenforceable” clauses are 
mutually exclusive—the former omits relevant legal context whereas the latter is flatly contrary to 
the law—a single clause cannot be both misleading and unenforceable. 
 66.  Id. at 7. 
 67.  Id. at 35.  Like Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman, Furth-Matzkin recruited her survey partici-
pants via Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Id. at 36; see supra note 24. 
 68.  Furth-Matzkin, supra note 2, at 35. 
 69.  Id. 
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contracts before signing them.70  Furth-Matzkin’s key result here was that, 
although renters may not read their leases before signing them, they are likely 
to do so when a problem arises in which their legal rights are implicated.71  
Her results indicate that approximately half of the survey respondents who 
experienced problems as a tenant consulted their leases, and only 7% of those 
who read their leases also consulted a lawyer.72  As a result, many people’s 
understanding of their legal rights once a problem arises depends on whether 
they recognize whether the terms of their leases are invalid. 
The second part of the questionnaire directly tested the survey respond-
ents’ legal beliefs.  The survey presented each respondent with one of five 
hypothetical lease clauses that are either misleading or unenforceable under 
Massachusetts landlord-tenant law: (1) a clause assigning all maintenance re-
sponsibility to the tenant; (2) a clause granting to the landlord attorney’s fees 
incurred in enforcing the lease; (3) a clause stating that the landlord will re-
turn the security deposit (less any deductions) but does not provide that the 
landlord will pay interest or keep the deposit in a separate account; (4) a 
clause that conditions the landlord’s covenant of quiet enjoyment on the ten-
ant’s payment of rent; and (5) a clause that disclaims the landlord’s liability 
for injuries on the premises resulting from the landlord’s negligence.73  In 
each of the five cases, Massachusetts law sets a mandatory rule, not a default 
rule.74  So, for example, the requirement under Massachusetts law that land-
lords repay a security deposit with interest cannot be altered by contract.  Ac-
cordingly, each of the five clauses misrepresented the law that governs every 
landlord-tenant relationship, including those governed by a lease containing 
the hypothetical misleading or unenforceable clause.  The survey then asked 
the respondent a question that targeted their beliefs about the legal issue ad-
dressed by the unenforceable clause.  For example, a respondent presented 
with the clause purporting to assign all maintenance and repair responsibility 
to the tenant was asked: “According to the law, who do you believe is re-
sponsible to make repairs in the apartment?”75 
Across the five scenarios, an average of almost 80% of the respondents 
answered incorrectly.76  That is, almost 80% of the survey respondents had 
false beliefs about whether the invalid lease clause was legally enforceable.  
For example, 86% of survey respondents who were presented with a clause 
                                                          
 70.  See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING 
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014). 
 71.  Furth-Matzkin, supra note 2, at 11, 37. 
 72.  Id. at 7.  Larger portions searched the web (24%) or consulted a friend or family member 
(33%) in addition to reading their leases.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 35–36, 90–93. 
 74.  Id. at 3–4. 
 75.  Id. at 36. 
 76. Id. at 33–39. 
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purporting to assign the responsibility for maintenance and repairs to the ten-
ant believed, “according to the law,” the tenant was mostly or entirely re-
sponsible for maintenance and repairs—even though Massachusetts law as-
signs that responsibility to the landlord.77  The following chart summarizes 
the results of Furth-Matzkin’s survey: 
TABLE 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Furth-Matzkin concluded, “The vast majority of [the sampled] 
leases . . . overstat[e] the tenant’s obligations and the landlord’s correspond-
ing rights and remedies” in ways that lead tenants to underestimate their own 
rights.78  Moreover, if landlords “misrepresent the law” by including unen-
forceable clauses that convey false information about the relevant legal rule, 
“most tenants are likely to rely on the selective information provided to them 
in the contract rather than obtaining information independently on the as-
sumption that their leases accurately represent the law.”79  Accordingly, the 
inclusion of such clauses “is likely to generate misperceptions concerning 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 38. 
 78.  Id. at 40. 
 79.  Id. at 41. 
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tenants’ rights and duties, consequently affecting tenants and their behavior 
in detrimental ways.”80 
C.  Remedies 
Finally, a new empirical study presented here for the first time shows 
that many people have false beliefs about contract remedies: It asked whether 
monetary compensation or specific performance is the standard remedy for 
breach of contract.  Prior empirical research showed that most people think 
breach is morally wrong and the remedy for breach should reflect the moral 
culpability of the breaching party.81  Moreover, most people prefer perfor-
mance over fully compensatory damages.82  Contract doctrine, however, re-
flects a strong preference for damages over specific performance.83  A key 
empirical question the literature does not address is whether non-lawyers 
think contract law’s doctrine of remedies matches their preferences and moral 
intuitions in favor of specific performance.  The empirical study presented 
here is the first to address that question.84 
1.  Methodology 
The study was conducted with a professional polling firm85 to survey 
1,003 respondents that formed a representative sample of the American adult 
population.86  The survey sample was drawn from a probability-based panel 
                                                          
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach 
of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 405 (2009). 
 82.  Id. at 420; see also Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David Hoffman, Breach is for Suckers, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2010) (“[P]eople seem to prefer performance and disdain money dam-
ages as a remedy, even when the level of damages appears to be fully or even overly compensatory 
from an objective standpoint.”). 
 83.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Specific per-
formance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expecta-
tion interest of the injured party.”). 
 84.  Wilkinson-Ryan performed some studies on this issue, but she has not published her full 
results.  See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Fault in Contracts: A Psychological Approach, in FAULT IN 
AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW 289, 298 (Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat eds., 2010). 
 85.  The survey was conducted by Ipsos using the web-enabled KnowledgePanel®, a probabil-
ity-based panel designed to be representative of the U.S. general population, not just the online 
population.  Initially, participants are chosen scientifically by a random selection of telephone num-
bers and residential addresses.  Persons in selected households are then invited by telephone or by 
mail to participate in the web-enabled KnowledgePanel®.  For those who agree to participate, but 
do not already have Internet access, Ipsos provides at no cost a laptop and ISP connection.  People 
who already have computers and Internet service are permitted to participate using their own equip-
ment.  Panelists then receive unique log-in information for accessing surveys online, and then are 
sent emails throughout each month inviting them to participate in research. 
 86.  The study was conducted online in Ipsos’s Omnibus survey.  It consisted of 1,003 nation-
ally representative interviews conducted between September 15 and September 17, 2017 among 
adults aged 18+.  The margin of error is +/-3 percentage points.  A full description of the study’s 
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of approximately 55,000 adults who were recruited through address-based 
sampling.  This methodology built and maintained the panel each quarter by 
contacting randomly selected individuals whose residential addresses ap-
peared in the most recent Delivery Sequence File of the U.S. Postal Service, 
which lists every residential delivery address in the United States.  The 
panel’s sample frame thus includes approximately 97% of the American pop-
ulation.  All recruitment contact, both via mail and via telephone, was con-
ducted in either English or Spanish as needed to ensure representativeness 
across those language populations.  All panel members were recruited 
through this method; in contrast to opt-in survey methodologies, no one could 
volunteer to participate in the panel.87  Once individuals were recruited into 
the panel, those that did not have internet access were provided with a free 
tablet computer and an internet connection in order to complete surveys.  This 
methodology ensured that the panel sampled from difficult-to-reach popula-
tions, including households who do not have a landline (either because they 
have only a cell phone or do not have a telephone at all), and households that 
do not have internet access.  The resulting panel and survey sample were then 
weighted to ensure representativeness for gender, age, race/ethnicity, educa-
tion level, census region, household income, and several other geodemo-
graphic variables. 
The survey presented each respondent with a vignette and then asked 
four questions.88  First, the respondent was randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: the Profit condition and the Avoid Loss condition.  The survey 
provided each respondent with one of two variations of a vignette in which 
the respondent signed a contract with a contractor named Jones to build a 
deck for the respondent’s house in time for the respondent’s family reunion 
over Labor Day.  In the Profit scenario, Jones breached the contract in order 
to complete a more profitable job building a deck for a different homeowner.  
In the Avoid Loss scenario, Jones breached the contract because the price of 
building materials went up, and so he would lose money if he completed the 
job.  Both versions of the vignette told the respondent she sued Jones in court 
for breach of contract and won. 
                                                          
methodology, including a description of statistical methods used in the analysis of the results, and 
the raw data is on file with the author. 
 87.  As the American Association for Public Opinion Research explained, “One serious conse-
quence” for non-probability-based, opt-in panels “is that only certain types of people may choose 
to opt into the survey and they may be different than those who do not in ways that could potentially 
bias the final results.” Sampling Methods for Political Polling, AM. ASS’N FOR PUB. OPINION RES., 
http://www.aapor.org/Education-Resources/Election-Polling-Resources/Sampling-Methods-for-
Political-Polling.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).  As a result, it recommends that “[r]esearchers 
should avoid nonprobability online panels when one of the research objectives is to accurately esti-
mate population values.”  Reg Baker et al., Research Synthesis: AAPOR Report on Online Panels, 
74 PUB. OPINION Q. 711, 714 (2010). 
 88.  The study instrument, including the full text of the two variations of the vignettes, appears 
in the Appendix. 
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This dual-vignette design allowed the study to determine whether peo-
ple’s beliefs about the legal remedy for breach vary between cases where the 
defendant breached to profit and cases where the defendant breached to avoid 
a loss.89  Prior empirical research showed that people think breaching to profit 
is morally worse than breaching to avoid a loss.90  The hypothesis for the 
experiment was that people assume the law of contract remedies tracks their 
moral intuitions about the wrongness of breach, and, therefore, a higher per-
centage of respondents believe specific performance is the legal remedy in 
the Profit scenario than in the Avoid Loss scenario. 
After reading the vignette, the survey asked each respondent a series of 
questions.  These questions probed respondents’ beliefs about the law of con-
tract remedies in two ways: by asking them (1) to predict the legal outcome 
of a case arising in the specific factual context presented by the vignette and 
(2) their general belief about what remedy a court typically orders in a con-
tract case.  For both vignettes, the survey asked respondents the substantive 
questions and then asked on a separate screen how confident they were in 
their answer to the substantive questions on a 4-level Likert scale.91 
The four questions were: 
(1)  When a court rules in favor of the plaintiff —that’s you, the 
party suing in court —it typically awards a “remedy” that orders 
the defendant to pay money or to do something.  Of the following 
two options, which remedy do you think the court will award to 
you in your case against Jones? 
 a.  The court will order Jones to build the deck for you by Labor 
Day in exchange for the agreed-upon price. 
 b.  The court will order Jones to refund your $5,000 and to pay 
you an additional amount of money to compensate for not having 
the deck in time for the family reunion. 
(2)  How confident are you in your answer about which remedy the 
court will award you in your case against Jones? 
 a.  Very confident. 
 b.  Somewhat confident. 
 c.  Slightly confident. 
 d.  Not at all confident. 
(3)  In general, in breach of contract cases, what do you think the 
court would award the plaintiff if he or she wins? 
                                                          
 89.  The random assignment of respondents to the Profit vignette or the Avoid Loss vignette, 
combined with statistical weighting, ensured that each group remained representative of the total 
population. 
 90.  Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 81, at 419–23. 
 91.  A Likert scale question asks a subject to indicate their response on a spectrum.  See I. 
Elaine Allen & Christopher A. Seaman, Column, Likert Scales and Data Analyses, QUALITY 
PROGRESS, July 2007, http://rube.asq.org/quality-progress/2007/07/statistics/likert-scales-and-
data-analyses.html (explaining the use of Likert scales in survey research).  
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 a.  The court would order the defendant to do what he/she agreed 
to do in the contract. 
 b.  The court would order the defendant to pay monetary com-
pensation to the plaintiff. 
(4)  How confident are you in your answer about which remedy the 
court typically awards a plaintiff in a breach of contract case? 
 a.  Very confident. 
 b.  Somewhat confident. 
 c.  Slightly confident. 
 d.  Not at all confident.92 
2.  Results 
The survey results show that many people falsely believe specific per-
formance is the typical remedy for breach of contract.  The results further 
show that people with less education or lower household income are signifi-
cantly more likely to have false beliefs about contract remedies than people 
with more education or higher household income.  Women are also signifi-
cantly more likely than men to falsely believe that specific performance is 
the remedy for breach.  Moreover, the results reveal that in addition to those 
with false beliefs about contract remedies, a substantial portion of those who 
answered correctly have little or no confidence in their response.  This latter 
group might represent those who are ignorant of the law but guessed correctly 
when asked. 
a.  General Contract Results 
Based on responses to the questions about the general contract case, the 
survey results indicate a substantial segment of the population has false be-
liefs about contract remedies and a further substantial segment is legally ig-
norant.  In response to question three, 31.03% of all respondents said the 
typical remedy for breach of contract is specific performance.93  In addition, 
another 18.15% of all respondents correctly answered that the typical remedy 
is damages but had little or no confidence in their answer.94  Together, 
49.18% of all respondents either reported false beliefs about the typical con-
tract remedy or demonstrated ignorance of the legal rule.  The overall popu-
lation is, therefore, almost exactly divided between those who know damages 
                                                          
 92.  See Appendix. 
 93.  Three hundred and eight respondents answered that the court would order the defendant to 
perform what they had agreed to do in the contract, 680 answered that the court would order the 
defendant to pay money to compensate the plaintiff, and 14 declined to answer the question. 
 94.  Of the 608 respondents who answered that damages are the typical remedy for breach, 41 
said they were not at all confident in their answer and 141 said they were slightly confident in their 
answer. 
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is the standard remedy for breach of contract and those who do not.  The 
following chart summarizes those results95: 
TABLE 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The prevalence of false beliefs and legal ignorance about contract rem-
edies is strongly correlated with educational level.  Over half (53.57%) of 
respondents who did not graduate from high school falsely believed the typ-
ical remedy for breach is specific performance.  The next chart shows the 
trend of false beliefs alone (not including those who answered correctly with 
little or no confidence) across education levels96: 
  
                                                          
 95.  The margin of error for false legal belief was +/- 2.9%.  The margin of error for legal 
knowledge was +/-3.1%. 
 96.  A regression of correct belief about contract remedies on education level yielded a positive 
association of 5.23%, statistically significant at the .001 level. 
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TABLE 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The educational gap persists when we consider both those who had false 
beliefs and those who answered correctly with little or no confidence, but it 
narrows at the highest education levels.  Almost three-quarters (73.81%) of 
respondents who did not graduate from high school falsely believed the 
standard remedy for breach is specific performance or reported little or no 
confidence in their correct answer.  The next chart shows the trend of false 
beliefs and those who answered correctly with little or no confidence across 
education levels97: 
  
                                                          
 97.  A regression of legal knowledge about contract remedies on education level yielded a pos-
itive association of 3.70%, statistically significant at the .001 level. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
FALSE BELIEFS ABOUT CONTRACT REMEDIES ACROSS
EDUCATION LEVELS
False Belief Correct Belief
 172 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:147 
TABLE 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The narrowing at the top end of the educational spectrum is driven by 
the fact that those with graduate degrees are more likely than others to have 
correct beliefs about contract remedies but with low confidence, while those 
with moderate levels of education—less than a graduate degree but more than 
a high school diploma—are more likely to have high confidence in their in-
correct answer.  That finding may be the result of the Dunning-Kruger effect, 
a cognitive bias by which those with modest levels of ability systematically 
overestimate themselves in their self-assessments.98  Nonetheless, even tak-
ing into account confidence levels, those with the least education were still 
far more likely to report false beliefs. 
                                                          
 98.  See Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in 
Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1122 (1999); see also PLATO & ARISTOPHANES, FOUR TEXTS ON SOCRATES 
para. 21d (Thomas G. West & Grace Starry West trans., rev. ed. 1998) (“For my part, as I went 
away, I reassured with regard to myself: ‘I am wiser than this human being.  For probably neither 
of us knows anything noble and good, but he supposes he knows something when he does not know, 
while I, just as I do not know, do not suppose that I do.  I am likely to be a little bit wiser than he in 
this very thing: that whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know.’”). 
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False beliefs about contract remedies also strongly correlate with in-
come level.  Just over half of those with household incomes below $20,000 
reported false beliefs about the remedy for breach.  The level of false beliefs 
dropped to below 25% for those with incomes above $150,000.  The next 
chart shows the relationship between household income level and false be-
liefs99: 
TABLE 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That trend persists when we also consider legal ignorance across income 
levels.  Almost two-thirds (63.4%) of those whose households make $20,000 
or less per year either falsely believed specific performance is the typical 
remedy for breach or had little or no confidence in their correct answer.  The 
next chart shows the trend of false beliefs and those who answered correctly 
with little or no confidence across household income levels100: 
  
                                                          
 99.  A regression of correct belief about contract remedies on income level yielded a positive 
association of 8.66%, statistically significant at the .001 level. 
 100.  A regression of legal knowledge about contract remedies on income level yielded a positive 
association of 7.38%, statistically significant at the .001 level.  Interestingly, the trend line would 
be much starker if we eliminated respondents with incomes above $175,000 a year.  The very 
wealthy appear to be significantly more likely than the moderately wealthy to falsely believe spe-
cific performance is the remedy for breach.  Indeed, almost half (44.8%) of those with household 
incomes over $250,000 a year had that false belief.  The only other income strata in which false 
beliefs were that frequent was the very poor, with income levels below $20,000 a year.  As with any 
subgroup analysis, this could simply be the result of random variation in the data.  But the stark and 
consistent trend upward beginning at incomes of $175,000 suggests the intriguing possibility of a 
deeper social explanation—the very rich generally expect to get what they pay for without excep-
tion. 
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TABLE 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, false beliefs and legal ignorance of contract remedies correlates 
with gender.  Regarding false beliefs, 36.23% of women falsely believed spe-
cific performance is the standard remedy, as opposed to 26.34% of men.101  
Regarding legal ignorance, 55.69% of women either answered incorrectly or 
had little or no confidence in their correct answer, as opposed to 43.76% of 
men.102  The next chart shows the relationship between false beliefs and gen-
der:  
  
                                                          
 101.  These results were statistically significant at the .001 level. 
 102.  These results were statistically significant at the .001 level. 
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TABLE 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b.  Vignette Results 
The survey returned much more surprising results for the questions re-
garding the vignettes about Jones.  The results were surprising in two re-
spects.  First, fewer respondents thought specific performance was the rem-
edy in the vignette cases than in the general contracts case.  One would 
anticipate the opposite result.  Both versions of the vignette present factual 
scenarios that one would expect to elicit greater moral intuitions in favor of 
specific performance than in the general case—the contract is framed as time-
sensitive because of the upcoming family reunion over Labor Day, and most 
respondents would likely find performance of the contract personally im-
portant.  Nonetheless, aggregating across the Profit and Avoid Loss scenar-
ios, 23.09% of respondents thought specific performance was the remedy for 
breach in the case against Jones, as opposed to 31.03% who thought specific 
performance was the remedy in the general breach of contract case.103  That 
difference persists but narrows if we add those who had little or no confidence 
in their correct answer: Again aggregating across the Profit and Avoid Loss 
scenarios, 43.47% of respondents either falsely believed specific perfor-
mance was the remedy in the case against Jones or had little or no confidence 
                                                          
 103.  Of the total sample, aggregating the results across the two vignettes involving Jones, 227 
respondents thought specific performance was the remedy, 756 respondents thought damages was 
the remedy, and 19 did not answer. 
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in their correct answer, as opposed to 49.18% of respondents who gave those 
responses for the question asking about the general contracts case. 
Second, although the hypothesis was that more people would think spe-
cific performance was the remedy in the Profit scenario than in the Avoid 
Loss scenario,104 the survey results show precisely the opposite.  Respond-
ents were substantially less likely to think specific performance was the rem-
edy when Jones breached to avoid a loss than they were to think it was the 
remedy in the case when Jones breached to profit more.  Only 13.88% of 
respondents who saw the Profit scenario thought the remedy in their case 
against Jones was specific performance.  By contrast, 32.25% of respondents 
who saw the Avoid Loss scenario thought the court would award them spe-
cific performance, approximately the same as the 31.03% of respondents who 
thought specific performance is the remedy in the general contracts case.  The 
following chart summarizes these results105: 
TABLE 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 104.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing empirical findings that most people 
find breach-to-profit more morally objectionable than breach-to-avoid-loss). 
 105.  The difference in false beliefs between the Avoid Loss and Profit scenarios was statistically 
significant at the .001 level.  The difference in false beliefs plus legal ignorance between the Avoid 
Loss and Profit scenarios was statistically significant at the .001 level.   
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Overall, these results show that a substantial portion of people falsely 
believe specific performance is the typical remedy for breach and signifi-
cantly more either have false beliefs or do not know the typical remedy for 
breach.  The results also show, as we might expect, that false beliefs about 
contract remedies, along with ignorance of contract remedies, tracks low ed-
ucation levels, low household income levels, and gender. 
II.  AUTONOMY THEORIES OF CONTRACT IN THE SHADOW OF ERROR 
A critical question that flows from these patterns of pervasive false be-
liefs and legal ignorance about contract law is whether they undermine the 
justification for contract doctrine offered by the traditional theories of con-
tract.  That such a question arises reflects a novel implication of the error 
theory of contract compared to error theories of other discourses.  Error the-
ories of morality,106 mathematics,107 and color108 claim people have false be-
liefs about an aspect of the world that is typically understood to be outside of 
human creation and control.  What mathematical facts there are or color prop-
erties physical objects have does not depend on what people believe.  So too 
with moral facts, at least according to the traditional moral realist views to 
which the error theory of morality is directly opposed.109  Law, by contrast, 
is a human practice that calls for justification both in its existence and in its 
specific content.  For any justificatory theory of contract law, the rationale 
for contract doctrine may rely on the beliefs and attitudes of the parties to 
which it applies.  Whether or not a particular legal rule is efficient or reflects 
the parties’ actual promises, for example, plausibly depends on whether those 
parties have accurate beliefs about that legal rule.  As a result, we must ex-
amine whether and how false beliefs and legal ignorance about contract doc-
trine affect, or even undermine, the existing doctrine’s justification. 
                                                          
 106.  See, e.g., JOYCE, supra note 14. 
 107.  See generally HARTRY FIELD, REALISM, MATHEMATICS, AND MODALITY (1989);  
HARTRY FIELD, SCIENCE WITHOUT NUMBERS (1980); HARTRY FIELD, TRUTH AND THE ABSENCE 
OF FACT (2001).  Philosophers of mathematics typically refer to such theories as “fictionalist” ac-
counts.  See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism, 15 PHIL. PERSP. 
69, 75–76 (2001).   
 108.  See generally Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman, Colour as a Secondary Quality, 
98 MIND 81 (1989); Paul A. Boghossian & J. David Velleman, Physicalist Theories of Color, 100 
PHIL. REV. 67 (1991). 
 109.  The moral case is more complicated than the mathematical case or color case.  Moral realist 
views claim moral facts exist independently of human beliefs or attitudes.  Various moral relativ-
isms or subjectivisms, by contrast, hold that moral truths depend in some way on people’s attitudes.  
See Seligman, supra note 14, at 12–13.  The case of moral constructivisms, like the views held by 
Tim Scanlon and Christine Korsgaard, is more complicated still—philosophers debate whether 
those views are best understood as depending on actual and hypothetical human beliefs and atti-
tudes.  Id. at 35–37. 
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This Part argues that pervasive false beliefs about contract doctrine un-
dermine promise- and consent-based theories’ justifications of existing con-
tract doctrine.110  Because those theories, typically referred to as “autonomy” 
theories,111 ground the normative justification for contract law in people’s 
actual promise or consent, people’s false beliefs about the substance of what 
they are agreeing to—and whether they are agreeing at all—threaten to topple 
the viability of autonomy theories entirely. 
Section II.A advances the core challenge against the viability of auton-
omy theories arising from false beliefs and legal ignorance.  It addresses how 
false beliefs about formation, the enforceability of unlawful terms, and the 
default remedy for breach each undermine the theories’ claim that contract 
doctrine is justified on the basis of people’s voluntary normative commit-
ment.  False beliefs about the default remedy for breach, in particular, pose a 
fundamental and widespread challenge to autonomy theorists’ justification of 
contract doctrine. 
Sections II.B and II.C examine whether autonomy theorists’ existing 
approaches to the justification of default rules can succeed in light of perva-
sive false beliefs about the default remedy for breach.  Section II.B argues 
that pervasive false beliefs about contract doctrine defeats Barnett’s consent-
by-reference approach to justifying background and default rules.  Section 
II.C argues that an appeal to secondary norms to justify default rules, consid-
ered in light of pervasive false beliefs about contract doctrine, amounts to 
abandoning autonomy as the primary normative basis for contract law.  The 
conclusion of this argument is that appeal to individual autonomy cannot jus-
tify existing contract doctrine in a substantial number of core cases because 
contract doctrine conflicts with, rather than respects, the freely expressed 
choices of many contracting parties.  The moral case for an autonomy-based 
justification of existing contract law is, accordingly, weak, and so the primary 
normative basis of contract doctrine must be found elsewhere. 
A.  The Failure of Autonomy Theories of Contract in Light of False 
Beliefs About Contract Doctrine 
Autonomy theories of contract, the primary philosophical alternatives 
to law and economics consequentialist theories,112 claim that the moral foun-
dation of contract law is grounded in the normative capacity of individuals to 
bind themselves through an exercise of will.  Fried and others believe that 
                                                          
 110.  Law and economics based consequentialist theories of contract, for their part, must account 
for people’s false beliefs about contract doctrine in their analysis of how people will respond to the 
incentives that contract doctrine creates.  That analysis may, in turn, recommend that contract doc-
trine and regulation of contracts should be reformed to better promote efficient outcomes in light of 
those false beliefs.  That analysis, which mirrors existing behavioral law and economics analyses of 
bounded rationality, is the subject of a future project. 
 111.  See Kraus, supra note 16, at 688. 
 112.  See id. at 687–90. 
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normative capacity is expressed through making a promise;113 Barnett views 
it as consenting to be legally bound;114 Professor Peter Benson recognizes it 
as forming a present intention to transfer a right.115  These varying autonomy 
theories are unified in their conception of contract law as an expression of 
self-determination.  For all autonomy theories, contract doctrine must “re-
spect . . . a person’s autonomy [by] respect[ing] . . . his unfettered voluntary 
choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the inter-
ests of others need protection from him.”116  As Fried put it, contract law’s 
enforcement of voluntary normative commitments is “a fair implication of 
liberal individualism” because it “carries to its natural conclusion the liberal 
premise that individuals have rights” by “respect[ing] the dispositions indi-
viduals make of their rights.”117  Accordingly, a core normative challenge for 
autonomy theories of contract is to reconcile contract doctrine’s coercive 
character—it must hold people to contracts, sometimes over their objec-
tions—with its moral foundation in the freedom of the parties to which it 
applies. 
Autonomy theories of contract easily meet that challenge with respect 
to a contract’s explicit terms of which the parties are aware.  The explicit 
terms of the contract, at least those known to and understood by the parties,118 
form the core content of a contracting party’s normative commitment, 
whether that commitment is thought of as a promise, consent, or something 
else.  For example, Fried’s “promise principle,” according to “which persons 
may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before,” provides 
a basis for holding parties to the explicit terms of their contracts because a 
contract “is first of all a promise,” and, therefore, “the contract must be kept 
because a promise must be kept.”119  In other words, the law should enforce 
                                                          
 113.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 1 (“The promise principle . . . is the moral basis of contract 
law.”); id. at 40 (stating that contract is “grounded in the primitive moral institution of promising”); 
see also Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 3 (2007) 
(“[C]ontract [is] rooted in, and underwritten by, the morality of promising . . . .”); Kraus, supra note 
15, at 1607–08; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 709. 
 114.  See Barnett, supra note 15, at 319; Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract 
Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 647, 647 (2012) [hereinafter Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise]. 
 115.  See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 
169, 191–95 (2001). 
 116.  Kraus, supra note 15, at 1608, 1648 (citing 3 JOEL FEINBURG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 68 (1986)); see also FRIED, supra note 15, at 57 (“The moral force behind contract 
as promise is autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to be.”). 
 117.  Fried, supra note 113, at 2; Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 21 (2014) (“[P]romissory obligation . . . ha[s] 
its roots in [the] deeper moral soil” of “trust and respect for persons”). 
 118.  This qualification recognizes the challenges that boilerplate terms, which are often un-
known to the less sophisticated party who does not read them, pose to autonomy-based theories of 
contract.  Section III.B addresses Barnett’s approach to unknown terms and its potential application 
to false beliefs.  
 119.  FRIED, supra note 15, at 1, 17. 
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contractual promises because it should respect individuals’ moral capacity to 
bind themselves through their promises, the scope of which includes at the 
very least the known and understood explicit terms of the contract that em-
bodies the party’s promise.  If the law failed to enforce a contract, with a 
scope at least as broad as those explicit terms, it would fail to respect our 
moral agency and the resulting capacity to make binding promises.  Barnett’s 
view that contract is based on consent to be legally bound has a similar moral 
basis: “To consent to a contract is to commit to be legally responsible for 
nonperformance of a promise.”120  And like the scope of a promise, the scope 
of that consent-based normative commitment is defined, at the very least, by 
the explicit terms of the contract which are known to and understood by the 
parties.  Accordingly, on either Fried or Barnett’s version of the autonomy 
theory of contract, the moral justification for holding people to the express 
terms of their contracts, even over their objections, is based on their free and 
voluntary assumption of that obligation. 
False beliefs and legal ignorance about contract doctrine complicate that 
justificatory story considerably when it is extended beyond the explicit terms 
of a contract.  Contract doctrine provides the rules that govern the exchange 
and supplement the explicit terms of the contract.  As Professor Richard Cras-
well explained, people’s normative commitment to the explicit terms of their 
contracts does not necessarily entail that they promised or consented to the 
governing rules, whether those rules are unalterable background rules or de-
fault rules that the parties can modify by explicit agreement.121  In the termi-
nology that Craswell used, whenever the parties do not address a particular 
issue in the explicit terms of the contract (either because they attempted to 
but failed to resolve the issue or because they simply neglected to consider 
it), the resulting contract has a “gap” that must be filled.122  Contract doctrine 
fills those gaps by providing background and default rules that govern, for 
example, interpretation, formation, remedies, excuse, and so on.  Those rules, 
in effect, provide implicit, legally implied terms to the contract that remain 
unstated on the contract’s face.  For example, consider the default rule in the 
                                                          
 120.  Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise, supra note 114, at 655 (emphasis omitted).  Barnett dis-
tinguishes his view from Fried’s promise theory by emphasizing that his conception of consent “is 
a commitment in addition to whatever moral commitment inheres in a promise.”  Id.; see also Bar-
nett, supra note 15, at 270.   
 121.  Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1989); Kraus, supra note 16, at 715–30.  Autonomy theorists offered 
responses to Craswell’s point, which I address below.  Craswell’s primary point was that, because 
background and default rules by definition fall outside of the scope of the explicit terms of the 
contract, and, therefore, outside of what he understood to be the scope of the normative commitment 
of the parties, the autonomy theory of contract could tell us nothing about what the background and 
default rules ought to be.  Craswell, supra note 121, at 490.  Indeed, he argued, because parties can 
contract around default rules, an autonomy theory of contract is consistent with any set of default 
rules.  Id.  That, in his view, was a serious theoretical shortcoming of the theory that left us no option 
but look to other normative foundations for background and default rules.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
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Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) that performance is excused when it 
becomes impracticable due to the failure of a basic assumption of the contract 
or as a result of good faith compliance with a governmental regulation.123  
When a contract does not, by its express terms, address the conditions under 
which performance is excused, the default rule plays the role of an implicit, 
legally implied term: Its legal effect is the same as if it were included as an 
express term in the contract.124  Pervasive false beliefs about contract doctrine 
are thus false beliefs about those implicit, legally implied terms in contracts. 
If people are mistaken about the substance of the implicit, legally im-
plied terms in a contract, then they have not agreed to the contract as it would 
be legally enforced.  Just as it would be contrary to the promise or consent of 
a party to hold people to doctrinally-imposed terms that contradicted the ex-
press terms of the contract,125 it would be contrary to their promise or consent 
to enforce implicit, legally implied terms that contradict what people thought 
they agreed to.  That is true even though an issue governed by a background 
or default rule was not addressed in the express terms of the contract—if a 
default rule implies an implicit term into a gap in the contract, that rule does 
so contrary to the consent of a party who believed the rule was different. 
The literature addressed a corresponding problem in the context of un-
read boilerplate terms.126  When people do not read boilerplate terms and are, 
therefore, unaware of their content, then at least at first glance they have not 
promised or consented to the boilerplate terms.  Autonomy theorists thus face 
                                                          
 123.  U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2014). (“Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or 
in part by a seller who complies with paragraphs (b) and (c) is not a breach of his duty under a 
contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a con-
tingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made or 
by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or 
order whether or not it later proves to be invalid.”). 
 124.  See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (explaining that default rules provide gap-
filling implicit contract terms). 
 125.  That is not to say such reformation is never justified, as when a court finds that the written 
expression of the contract does not reflect what the parties actually intended.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 155 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Nonetheless, absent a more complicated 
story (which scholars attempted to offer at least in the case of unconscionability), the justification 
for departure from the express terms to which the parties agreed is typically not based on the promise 
or consent of the party against whom it is enforced.  See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, 
Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 221–30 (2000). 
 126.  See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631, 632 (1943); Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An 
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 737 (1931); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An 
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983).  Economically oriented contract 
theorists have argued for decades, by contrast, that criticisms of adhesion contracts with boilerplate 
terms are overblown.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 
933–34 (2006) (arguing that although traditional arguments against boilerplate are “exaggerate[d],” 
it can result in inefficient outcomes due to, among other things, anticompetitive conduct).  The 
problem of legal ignorance has implications for the proper response to the problem of boilerplate.  
See infra Section III.C. 
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a significant challenge in explaining how contract doctrine is morally justi-
fied in holding people to those terms.127  Similarly, at least at first glance, 
autonomy theorists face a significant challenge in explaining how contract 
doctrine itself is morally justified when people are mistaken or ignorant about 
that doctrine because the application of contract doctrine amounts to holding 
people to implicit, legally implied terms they have false beliefs about and, 
therefore, to which they did not promise or consent.  Accordingly, when a 
court enforces a contract against a party who was mistaken or ignorant of the 
doctrinal rule governing the issue in dispute, it does so without the moral 
basis of the party’s promise or consent. 
Consider first false beliefs about contract formation.  Contract doctrine 
establishes background rules that govern which statements and conduct suf-
fice to form a contract.  The background rules of formation do not typically 
appear as explicit terms in a contract, so those rules apply to the contract as 
implicit, legally implied terms.  Accordingly, if a party has false beliefs about 
the substance of those implicit, legally implied terms governing formation, 
they have not promised or consented to them.  Recall that people’s false be-
liefs about the doctrine of formation divide into two categories: false posi-
tives, in which a party falsely believes the contract is formed when by law it 
is not; and false negatives, in which a party falsely believes the contract is 
not formed when by law it is.128  The problem false negatives pose for an 
autonomy theory of contract is clear: If someone believes they have not yet 
entered a contract, then they have not yet made whatever normative commit-
ment the autonomy theory requires in order to justify holding people to a 
contract.  This issue is related to but distinct from the much-discussed prob-
lem of contract doctrine’s focus on objective rather than subjective assent.129  
The problem in false positive formation cases is not simply that subjective 
assent may be lacking, though that is certainly true.  The problem runs deeper.  
If, for example, a person falsely believes one cannot create a legally binding 
agreement without a written signature, then they have affirmative false be-
liefs about the objective acts required to form the contract.  Because they do 
not think they have done what is required to reach an agreement, the doctrine 
                                                          
 127.  As with the challenge posed by default rules, autonomy theorists offered theoretically sim-
ilar attempts to answer the challenge posed by boilerplate.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Consenting 
to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 627 (2002).  The alternative approach is to suggest 
that boilerplate terms should often be unenforceable.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 70; Robin B. Kar 
& Margaret J. Radin, Pseudo-Contract & Shared Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2019). 
 128.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 129.  For example, Barnett claimed that one of the principal advantages of his consent theory 
over Fried’s promise theory is that, in his view, it explains why contract doctrine adopts an objective 
rather than subjective approach.  See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 15, at 270.  Fried and others dispute 
whether Barnett’s theory actually explains contract doctrine, or if it too is committed to a subjective 
approach.  See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK L. REV. 961, 
973–74, 974 n.50 (2012). 
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that holds them to the contract cannot be justified on the basis of their auton-
omy, even if the autonomy theory adopts an objective approach to assent. 
False positive formation cases present a subtler problem for autonomy 
theories.  In such cases, because people’s belief that they are in a binding 
contract is false, contract doctrine would not hold them to a contract to which 
they had not promised or consented—if a contract is not (yet) formed, con-
tract doctrine will not hold them to anything at all.  As a result, it may seem 
that false positive formation cases pose no problem for autonomy theories.  
Because contract doctrine is not forcing the party with mistaken beliefs to do 
anything, there is nothing that requires normative justification.  There is, 
nonetheless, a sense in which contract doctrine’s divergence from people’s 
beliefs in false positive cases undermines those parties’ autonomy outside the 
context of a court’s coercive judgment.   
People contract in the shadow of the law.  Law is a human institution 
embedded in a broader society that must be normatively justified both with 
respect to what courts do to litigants and with respect to how we know con-
tract doctrine affects what people do of their own accord outside of court.  In 
false positive formation cases, contract doctrine releases the ignorant party’s 
counterparty from liability while the ignorant party falsely believes them-
selves to be bound.  But because they believe the contract to be formed, they 
also falsely believe their counterparty to be bound.  If the ignorant party 
knew their counterparty was not bound, they would probably consider them-
selves released as well.  Contract law’s infringement of the ignorant party’s 
autonomy lies not in forcing them to do something, as in a false negative 
formation case, because it does not force them to do anything at all.  Rather, 
it lies in the law’s unilateral elimination of their counterparty’s obligations 
under the agreement the parties thought they reached. 
Consider next false beliefs about unlawful terms.  As with false positive 
formation cases, the problem is subtle because contract doctrine does not 
force the ignorant party to do anything.  The problem is not that contract 
doctrine enforces a term against a party’s will; the problem is people falsely 
believe contract doctrine would enforce a term against them when actually it 
will not.  Because unlawful terms typically appear in boilerplate, there is a 
real question as to whether people consent to most of the unlawful terms that 
appear in actual contracts.  But even if they consented to those unlawful 
terms, they will abide by an agreement the law disallows due to their false 
beliefs.  Sometimes the policy of disallowing certain contract terms is itself 
justified by autonomy considerations—for example, some scholars argue that 
unconscionability doctrine is grounded in the law’s suspicion that the very 
presence of certain highly objectionable terms in a contract indicate a failure 
of consent or a disrespect for the party’s autonomy.130  Accordingly, in those 
                                                          
 130.  See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 125, at 221–30. 
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cases, contract doctrine’s acquiescence to the presence of unlawful terms 
people falsely believe bind them and, therefore, abide by is an affront to the 
autonomy values that justified the law’s prohibition of the unlawful term in 
the first place, even if a court would never enforce the term if the case were 
litigated. 
Finally, consider false beliefs about the default remedy for breach.  At 
first glance, the threat to autonomy may seem elusive.  If a party with false 
beliefs about the default remedy for breach is a defendant, they will be sur-
prised to learn that they are liable for (what most people consider to be) a 
lesser remedy than they anticipated: They are liable only for damages, not 
for specific performance.  That unexpected leniency hardly seems problem-
atic for an autonomy theory because the defendant promised or consented to 
a harsher remedy than the law subjects them to.  If they are a plaintiff, then 
the court does not force them to do anything at all.  It awards them a disap-
pointing remedy, but because the court exercises no coercion against them, 
that award does not seem contrary to their normative commitment in entering 
the contract.  And so, as with the cases in which the party is a defendant, the 
doctrine of expectation damages may not appear to be in tension with the 
autonomy theory of contract. 
That appearance is mistaken: The threat to autonomy posed by false be-
liefs about the default remedy for breach is both profound and widespread.  
The default remedy for breach, like any background or default rule, operates 
as an implicit, legally implied term in a contract.  When people enter an 
agreement expecting that implicit term to award them specific performance, 
the expectation likely affects the price they are willing to pay for the contract.  
Because people almost always prefer specific performance to damages, peo-
ple would be willing to pay less for a contract that provides for damages than 
an otherwise identical contract that provides for specific performance.131  So, 
if a contract, including the implicit, legally implied terms created by default 
rules, actually provides only for damages when a party falsely believed it 
provided them with specific performance, then the contract extracts a price 
higher than what they would be willing to pay for the remedy that they will 
actually get.  As a result, in cases where a party falsely believes the law will 
provide them with specific performance, the doctrinal default rule of expec-
tation damages enforces a bargain different from the agreement they thought 
they entered with respect to two of its most essential terms: price and remedy.  
That problem affects every case in which a party has false beliefs about the 
default remedy for breach because in every such case both the remedy term 
and the price term are skewed by those false beliefs.  Accordingly, an auton-
omy theory of contract appears to fail to justify that central aspect of contract 
doctrine in a vast number of cases. 
                                                          
 131.  See Wilkinson-Ryan & David Hoffman, supra note 82, at 1013. 
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The widespread skewing of bargains in light of people’s false beliefs 
about contract remedies thus poses a fundamental challenge to the autonomy 
theory.  That, however, is not the end of the story.  For decades, autonomy 
theorists132 and their opponents133 recognized that background and default 
rules present a particular challenge to their theories.  The initial challenge 
does not depend on the existence of false beliefs about contract doctrine.  Ra-
ther, the initial challenge is simply that people do not appear to promise or 
consent to the background law in the way they do to the explicit terms of a 
contract.134  In response to that challenge, autonomy theorists deployed two 
approaches.  Barnett’s approach, which I call the “consent-by-reference” ap-
proach, argues that the initial impression that background and default rules 
fall outside the scope of parties’ consent is mistaken.135  Fried’s approach, 
which I call the “secondary norms” approach, concedes that the justification 
of background and default rules of contract cannot rest on the voluntary nor-
mative commitment of the parties.  He, therefore, appeals to other normative 
considerations—like the parties’ expectations, moral notions of “fault,” eco-
nomic efficiency, and others.136 
The remainder of this Part considers the viability of those two strategies 
in light of pervasive false beliefs about the default remedy for breach.  It 
ultimately argues that neither approach to reconciling the autonomy theory 
of contract with pervasive false beliefs about contract remedies can salvage 
its success as a justification for contract law. 
B.  The Consent-By-Reference Approach 
The consent-by-reference approach infers parties’ actual consent to de-
fault rules provided by contract doctrine from the fact that they entered the 
contract and did not alter the default rule by express agreement.137  As Barnett 
stated the view, “[B]y invoking the system of legal enforcement, one is im-
plicitly accepting that the legal system may be called upon to interpret the 
agreement and fill any gaps.  Silence in the face of this prospect manifests a 
                                                          
 132.  Fried, for example, saw the problems in applying his promise principle to justify back-
ground and default rules in the first edition of Contract as Promise.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 
60, 69. 
 133.  See generally Craswell, supra note 121. 
 134.  Id. at 489–90. 
 135.  See infra notes 137–143 and accompanying text.  
 136.  See infra notes 148–155 and accompanying text.  
 137.  See Barnett, supra note 19, at 867–69.  That argument does not apply to unalterable back-
ground rules of contract law.  Id.  Partially for that reason, Barnett expresses a strong preference for 
default rules over background rules.  Id.  The consent-by-reference approach might nonetheless 
claim, in a similar vein to its treatment of default rules, people consent to the application of what 
few unalterable background rules are found in contract law because they chose to enter the contract 
at all.  But, given the practical inevitability of entering contracts in the modern world, the resulting 
conception of consent is thin to the point of implausibility. 
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consent to those gap-filling provisions that one might have changed by speak-
ing up.”138  He applied this argument, in the first instance, to well-lawyered 
and sophisticated parties who have both the means and the motivation to 
know the default rules and to contract around them.  In such cases, “[p]arties 
who do not contract around these default rules can realistically be said to have 
objectively manifested their consent to them.”139 
But for contracts in which one or both parties are not so sophisticated or 
not so well-lawyered, that straightforward inference to the parties’ actual 
consent to a default rule cannot work.  Barnett recognized the threat to con-
sent posed by legal ignorance about default rules, so he adopted a strategy to 
minimize the number of cases in which contract doctrine enforces an agree-
ment that departs from the consent of the parties.  To do this, he endorsed 
conventionalist default rules: those rules that “reflect[] the commonsense ex-
pectations within the relevant community of discourse.”140  When a default 
rule matches those “commonsense expectations,” he argued, it “is likely to 
satisfy the parties’ intentions as well [as] . . . any rival default rule.”141  Ac-
cordingly, he claimed, 
If a goal of a consent theory is to have the law of contract honor 
the subjective consent of the parties to the extent possible in a 
world of limited access to personal knowledge of intentions, de-
fault rules reflecting the commonsense expectation within the rel-
evant community of discourse will lead to fewer interpretive mis-
takes than some other type of rule.142 
The shape of the argument, then, is that the presence of default rules in 
contract law is a practical necessity, and conventionalist default rules are con-
sistent with the parties’ consent in more cases than any alternative default 
rule.  Because conventionalist default rules best advance the normative aims 
of a consent theory of contract, Barnett concluded, those are the sorts of de-
fault rules contract doctrine should adopt.143 
                                                          
 138.  Id. at 865; see also Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise, supra note 114, at 660 (“Notwith-
standing that the rules of contract law are supplied by the courts or legislature rather than by the 
parties, under certain circumstances, the parties can be said to have consented to the application of 
those background rules by remaining silent and accepting their operation.”); id. (“By remaining 
silent, they have consented to whatever term the law supplies as a gap-filler and the conflict between 
freedom from and freedom to contract is ameliorated.”). 
 139.  Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise, supra note 114, at 660; see also Barnett, supra note 19, 
at 894 (“[I]n cases where both parties are rationally informed and can be counted on both to know 
the law and to contract around any default rules that do not reflect their subjective preferences, 
whatever default rule the law selects can be viewed as consensual.”). 
 140.  Barnett, supra note 19, at 882. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id.; see also id. at 897 (“[N]ested within this overall consent are default rules that are cho-
sen to reduce the disparity between the objective meaning of consent and the subjective intentions 
of the parties.”). 
 143.  Id.  To some commentators, this approach awkwardly combines deontological and conse-
quentialist considerations: It appears to argue that the law should minimize the number of times (a 
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The heterogeneity of false beliefs and legal ignorance about contract 
doctrine thwarts the effectiveness of conventionalist default rules for an au-
tonomy theory of contract.  The standard argument in favor of conventionalist 
default rules, which the literature more often refers to as “majoritarian” de-
fault rules,144 is that they conform to what most people prefer the rule to be 
and, thereby, minimize the transaction costs associated with contracting 
around the default.145  Barnett repurposed the notion of majoritarian defaults 
to serve his theoretical ends: Instead of focusing on which rule most people 
prefer, he focused on which rule most people already think is the rule.  
Adopting such a default rule, at first glance, appears to minimize the number 
of cases in which contract doctrine enforces an implicit, legally implied term 
against the consent of the parties. 
The empirical results presented in Section I.C show that this strategy 
fails.  Those results illustrate that the population is sharply divided between 
those who falsely believe the standard remedy for breach is specific perfor-
mance; those who correctly believe the remedy is damages but with little or 
no confidence in their belief; and those who are confident in their correct 
belief that the remedy is damages.  Across the entire population, more than 
30% of people have false beliefs about the remedy and nearly 20% have little 
or no confidence in their correct answer.  Depending on the subgroup, as few 
as 20% or as many as almost 75% of people have that false belief.146  Ac-
cordingly, any default rule for breach would conflict with the expectations of 
a substantial portion of the population.147 
                                                          
consequentialist notion) it violates people’s autonomy (a deontological notion).  See Kraus, supra 
note 16, at 689 and n.7.  To the extent that observation of his theory holds true, Barnett’s view “no 
longer clearly qualifies as a purely deontic theory.”  Id.  The upshot here is Barnett’s “silent consent” 
approach would collapse into a “secondary norms” approach I address in Section III.C. 
 144.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999). 
 145.  Id. at 1591–92. 
 146.  See supra Section I.C. 
 147.  Moreover, because the parties can alter majoritarian defaults, if contract doctrine adopted 
a default for specific performance, sophisticated parties would simply insert a boilerplate term 
switching the remedy back to damages.  Because most people do not read boilerplate, they would 
remain ignorant of the governing legal rule.  See Bakos et al., supra note 70, at 2.  A penalty default 
rule would fail for the same reason.  Penalty defaults are selected to conform to the opposite of what 
sophisticated parties prefer, which induces them to explicitly contract around the default rule and, 
thereby, inform their counterparty of the governing legal rule.  See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra 
note 124 (discussing penalty default rules).  As with a majoritarian default, that approach would fail 
here because, at best, a penalty default rule induces sophisticated parties to insert a boilerplate term 
to switch the remedy for breach back to damages.  Requiring or inducing parties to include an ex-
press term governing the remedy for breach shows promise in aligning people’s beliefs about the 
law and contract doctrine itself.  See Matthew A. Seligman, Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach, 
117 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that consumer contracts should be required to in-
clude an express exit clause setting an exit fee equivalent to expectation damages in order to align 
the scope of people’s perceived moral obligations with firms’ approach to breach).  But that ap-
proach works only if the express clause actually informs parties of the governing legal rule. 
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Even by his own metric—limiting to some tolerable level the number of 
cases in which contract doctrine contradicts the parties’ consent—the heter-
ogeneity of people’s pervasive false beliefs about the default remedy for 
breach defeats Barnett’s consent-by-reference approach.  Although he never 
specified the threshold number of non-consensual cases below that he would 
count his consent theory as successful in justifying contract doctrine, the em-
pirical results show that any reasonable threshold is exceeded.  An autonomy 
theory of contract that would enforce contract doctrine against people’s 
promise or consent in at least 20% of cases and as many as 75% of cases 
among certain demographic groups cannot qualify as a success. 
C.  The Secondary Norms Approach 
If a pure autonomy theory cannot itself justify contract doctrine’s de-
fault rule about the remedy for breach, then an autonomy theorist might seek 
to rely on secondary norms to justify that aspect of contract doctrine.  Fried 
took this secondary norms approach in Contract as Promise with respect to 
other aspects of contract doctrine.148  He recognized that “all contracts fail to 
specify the parties’ intentions in respect to matters that ex ante seem quite 
remote and, at any rate, not worth spelling out.”149  As a result, “courts are 
regularly called upon to fill in details that only ex post may loom large.”150  
When the contract fails to address an issue, “the court is forced to sort out the 
difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but actually have 
not.  The one basis on which these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of 
the agreement—that is, of contract as promise.”151  Because, Fried conceded, 
the autonomy principle cannot justify the application of background and de-
fault rules to fill “gaps” in the normative commitment of the parties, he must 
rely on other normative considerations to do that justificatory work: fairness, 
altruism, economic efficiency, and so on.152 
Fried initially argued that the expectation remedy followed from the 
promise principle: 
If I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and if I fail to 
keep my promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand over the 
equivalent of the promised performance.  In contract doctrine this 
proposition appears as the expectation measure of damages for 
breach. The expectation standard gives the victim of a breach no 
                                                          
 148.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 60–69. 
 149.  Fried, supra note 129, at 971. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  FRIED, supra note 15, at 60; see also id. at 69 (“The gaps cannot be filled, the adjustments 
cannot be governed, by the promise principle.”); id. at 72 (“Obviously some standard of sharing 
external to the intention of the parties must control.”). 
 152.  Id. at 69–73. 
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more or less than he would have had had there been no breach—in 
other words, he gets the benefit of his bargain.153 
Since Fried’s initial statement of his position, and in view of the “the 
moral criticism and economic defense of expectation damages,” he modified 
his stance to sever “the connection between the promise principle and expec-
tation damages.”154  If the remedy for breach is not governed by the promise 
principle, then it falls within the class of default rules that Fried argued must 
be justified by secondary norms.155 
This secondary norms approach fails because it sees “gaps” where fre-
quently there are none.  That there are gaps in the express terms of a contract 
does not mean there are gaps in the content of the normative commitment a 
party made when they entered the contract.  The default rule of expectation 
damages does not imply a term into an empty space in a contract.  As the 
empirical results in Section I.C show, people are not blank slates on the issue 
of contract remedies.  Most people have an affirmative belief about what 
remedy they will receive if their counterparty breaches, and in a great many 
cases, those beliefs are false.  As a result, contract doctrine’s default remedy 
of expectation damages does not fill a gap; it imposes an implicit, legally 
implied term that contradicts the content of the normative commitment the 
party made in entering the agreement.156 
                                                          
 153.  Id. at 17; see also id. at 19 (“[I]f a person is bound by his promise and not by the harm the 
promisee may have suffered in reliance on it, then what he is bound to is just its performance.  Put 
simply, I am bound to do what I promised you I would do—or I am bound to put you in as good a 
position as if I had done so.”); Kraus, supra note 16, at 728 (arguing that the expectation remedy is 
consistent with the promise principle if people’s promises include second-order content that sets 
compensation as the moral remedy for breaking the promise). 
 154.  Fried, supra note 129, at 968. 
 155.  Id.; see also FRIED, supra note 15, at 60, 69.  Barnett argued that Fried’s secondary norms 
approach relegates the promise theory to irrelevance:  
But “contractual accidents” not covered by express agreements fill the pages of every 
contracts casebook.  Indeed, very few of the classic cases of contract law would have 
existed had the parties expressly anticipated what precisely occurred.  In effect, Fried 
must consider most of the actual law of contract to be noncontractual because it is not 
based on promise.   
Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise,  supra note 114, at 661.  This criticism misses the mark.  Fried’s 
aim was not only (or even primarily) to justify the doctrinal choice of rules that govern the hard 
cases finding their way into the casebooks.  Rather, he sought to find whether there is a moral 
foundation for the existence of the coercive institution of contract law at all, including for the vast 
majority of cases that are too doctrinally simple to warrant much attention.  Barnett’s criticism, so 
far as it goes, does not join issue with Fried’s argument on that more basic normative aim.  But, as 
I shall argue, the pervasive presence of false beliefs about the default remedy for breach undermines 
Fried’s justificatory story even in the easy cases. 
 156.  To situate my argument in relation to Craswell’s critique of autonomy theories: Craswell 
argued that autonomy theories lack explanatory power because they do not give us any reason to 
adopt one default rule over another because default rules lie outside the content of the parties’ nor-
mative commitment.  See Craswell, supra note 121, at 689.  He concluded that an autonomy theory 
is, therefore, consistent with any default rule.  Id.  By contrast, I argue that parties’ affirmative false 
beliefs about the default remedy for breach, which partially define the content of their normative 
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That contradiction between contract doctrine’s default rule about the 
remedy for breach and the content of a party’s normative commitment in en-
tering the contract creates a fundamental problem for the secondary norms 
approach.  An autonomy theory of contract like Fried’s may coherently rely 
on secondary, non-autonomy norms to supply answers to doctrinal questions 
that simply are not addressed by the theory’s primary autonomy norm.  But 
if the content of a person’s normative commitment associated with their con-
tract includes a commitment to a particular remedy—as is the case for the 
many people who falsely believe the law will provide them with specific per-
formance—then for the theory to rely on non-autonomy norms to justify the 
default remedy for breach is not to supplement the autonomy norm.  It is to 
supersede it.  The problem is thus that relying on secondary norms to justify 
the default remedy for breach relegates an autonomy principle to the sidelines 
not in only marginal cases, not in only a few cases, but in every case in which 
a party has a false belief about the default remedy for breach.  When people 
have false beliefs about the default remedy for breach, they have not con-
sented to two of the most essential terms in the contract: the price and the 
remedy for breach.  The result is that an autonomy theory of contract that 
attempts to justify the default rule of expectation damages on the basis of 
secondary norms abdicates its central normative role in contract theory not 
merely for peripheral cases.  It no longer provides a moral foundation for the 
core of orthodox contract doctrine in a vast number of cases. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF ERROR 
This Article has argued thus far that an autonomy theory of contract, 
based on the normative foundation of promise or consent, cannot justify or-
thodox contract doctrine in the vast number of cases in which one of the par-
ties has false beliefs about certain core aspects of contract doctrine.  That 
problem surfaces with respect to false beliefs about contract formation and 
enforceability but arises in the greatest number of cases with respect to the 
default remedy for breach.  The conclusion thus far is a domain restriction: It 
demarcates the range of cases in which the autonomy theory of contract can, 
and cannot, serve to justify orthodox contract doctrine.157  As a result, this 
                                                          
commitment in a contract, entails that the default rule is affirmatively inconsistent with an autonomy 
justification for contract doctrine.  In other words, Craswell’s critique of the autonomy theory is 
based on the idea that the promise principle does not cover the question of contract remedies; my 
critique is based on the empirically-supported claim that it does. 
 157.  Cf. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1093, 1093–94 (2012) [hereinafter Markovits & Schwartz, Expectation Remedy Revisited] (explain-
ing that their view on the myth of “efficient breach” depends on four “domain assumptions,” which 
entails their conclusion holds only in that range of cases for which those assumptions are true); see 
also Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the Expec-
tation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011).  Markovits and Schwartz argued that the expectation 
default is a good rule on the ground that if (but only if) the four domain assumptions are satisfied, 
then parties would choose expectation damages as a contract term.  Id. at 1977–79.  From that, they 
 2018] THE ERROR THEORY OF CONTRACT 191 
Article makes no claim about the autonomy theory’s viability with respect to, 
for example, well-lawyered firms that know all the relevant background law.  
But the range of cases in which the autonomy theory does fail is broad and 
important: most cases involving non-lawyers. 
The next task is to identify the practical legal implications of that con-
clusion for the range of cases in which the autonomy theory of contract fails.  
The remainder of this Part begins charting those implications.  Section III.A 
unfolds the doctrinal price of autonomy by examining the doctrinal implica-
tions that would follow from a principled adherence to the autonomy theory 
in light of widespread false beliefs about contract doctrine.  The result would 
be the unacceptable conclusion that vast numbers of contracts are voidable.  
Rather than accept that unpalatable conclusion, we ought to abandon the au-
tonomy theory that led there.  Section III.B explores the doctrinal implica-
tions of that move by examining two contexts: contract doctrine and contract 
boilerplate. 
A.  The Doctrinal Price of Autonomy 
One way to see the gravity of the problem for the autonomy theorist is 
to ask: Once we recognize the problem of false beliefs and legal ignorance 
about contract doctrine, what results would a truly autonomy-based contract 
doctrine yield when applied to those cases?  What doctrinal results would an 
autonomy theorist be committed to if they followed their theory to its ultimate 
conclusion?  The answer to those questions, applying the doctrine of mistake, 
may be that vast numbers of contracts are voidable.  The unpalatability of 
that radical conclusion, in turn, suggests that we ought to abandon the auton-
omy theory as the normative basis for contract doctrine. 
The core moral idea demarcating the metes and bounds of voidability 
under the doctrine of unilateral mistake is one of simple fairness.158  On the 
one hand, it seems unfair to hold a mistaken party to a contract when they did 
                                                          
inferred that certain real parties actually intend to enter agreements in which the expectation remedy 
is an implicit term:  
[I]f promisee sophistication is assumed, the [expectation remedy] term arises out of the 
parties’ actual intentions and not just out of intentions that it would be rational for them 
to have or fair to impute to them. The [expectation remedy] promise, that is, is as real, as 
much a product of the parties’ actual intentions, as the promises that constitute the action 
and price terms.   
Id. at 1978.  That conclusion may appear to conflict with the empirical data and ensuing arguments 
presented in this Article.  But as their conclusion indicated, the first of Schwartz and Markovits’s 
“domain assumptions” is that “[c]ontracting parties are sophisticated and rational,” which must in-
clude the assumption that the parties know what the default remedy is.  Markovits & Schwartz, 
Expectation Remedy Revisited, supra at 1093–94.  The paradigmatic example of such a party is a 
well-lawyered firm.  The upshot is that Markovits and Schwartz are talking about a different set of 
parties than those on which this Article focuses: laypeople without lawyers, many of whom lack the 
legal knowledge that more “sophisticated” parties possess. 
 158.  This discussion focuses on the situation where only one party is mistaken about the law—
which, in many contexts like consumer law, will be the standard case. 
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not agree to its substance.  On the other hand, it is also perhaps equally unfair 
to the counterparty to cancel the contract on which they relied—after all, the 
counterparty was not the one who was mistaken.  As Fried put it, “As the 
parties [did not] agree, the court can only look to extrinsic standards of fair-
ness for a solution.”159 
That notion of fairness, as manifest in the doctrine of unilateral mistake, 
is at least in part grounded on notions of fault.  Contemporary contract doc-
trine provides that, under certain circumstances, when one party is mistaken 
about a basic assumption of a contract, the contract is voidable at the option 
of the mistaken party.160  But if it is only a unilateral mistake, the mistaken 
party may not void the contract unless (1) mistake enforcing the contract not-
withstanding the mistake would be unconscionable or (2) the non-mistaken 
party either had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mis-
take.161  These latter two conditions reflect the requirement of fault to justify 
canceling the contract for the mistaken party’s benefit.  It would be unfair to 
hold someone to a contract to which they did not fully consent due to their 
mistake when their non-mistaken counterparty had reason to know of the 
mistake or actually precipitated the mistake because the mistake would, in 
that case, be the counterparty’s fault.  Similarly, although the notion of un-
conscionability is inchoate and underdeveloped, especially in the context of 
unilateral mistake, it too seems to rest on some notion of fault.162  As Melvin 
Eisenberg explained the idea, in cases of unilateral mistake, “[T]he concept 
of unconscionability refers to cases where it is morally improper to seek full 
enforcement of a promise that was based on such an error,”163 and that moral 
impropriety—“what kind of conduct is not conscionable”—in turn “must de-
pend on what kind of conduct involves moral fault.”164 
The notion of fault could provide powerful ammunition for the auton-
omy theorist who would maintain the doctrinal status quo notwithstanding 
                                                          
 159.  FRIED, supra note 15, at 63. 
 160.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  Recall that the 
Restatement treats mistakes of law and mistakes of fact the same.  Id. § 151 cmt. b.  And there 
appears to be no principled reason to treat them differently: In both cases, the mistaken party failed 
to consent to some aspect of the agreement due to a false belief about the relevant context in which 
the contract was putatively formed. 
 161.  Id. § 153(a)–(b). 
 162.  See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unex-
pected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 
1418 (2009) (“Although the essential role of moral fault is not as explicit under American law as it 
is under some civil-code and civil-code-based rules, it is implicit in the concept of unconscionabil-
ity: what kind of conduct is not conscionable must depend on what kind of conduct involves moral 
fault.”). 
 163.  Id. at 1427–28; see also id. at 1428 (“In these cases, the nonmistaken party will be restored 
to his precontract wealth by an award of reliance damages.  A fair-minded person who has been 
made whole in this way would not try to take advantage of a mechanical error by inflicting a further 
loss on the mistaken party so as to make a gain that is not earned by knowledge, skill, or diligence.”). 
 164.  Id. at 1418. 
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people’s pervasive false beliefs about the default remedy for breach.  The 
reason is that those with such false beliefs may seem to be at fault for having 
them.  Unlike many cases of mistake of fact, where the mistaken party had 
no practicable way of discovering the fact of which they were ignorant, the 
law is in the public domain.  All one needs to do is look.  And, unlike those 
few cases of mistake of law recognized by the courts, which concern rela-
tively obscure concepts of law, like the rule against perpetuities,165 the law 
of expectation damages, for example, is among the more straightforward as-
pects of contract law.166  And so, this argument goes, people who are ignorant 
of contract law are at fault for their own mistake.  It, therefore, may hardly 
seem “morally improper” to enforce a bargain against someone who had mis-
taken beliefs about the content of law that was so easily accessible to them. 
Notwithstanding that people could, theoretically, discover the content 
of contract doctrine through the investigation of legal sources, I think the 
stronger argument is laypeople are blameless for their false beliefs about con-
tract law.  The likely explanation for why so many people have false beliefs 
about contract law goes a long way toward showing why those false beliefs 
are reasonable.  Most people—indeed, essentially everyone aside from law-
yers—do not learn the content of the law by reading cases and treatises.  Ra-
ther, it is more plausible that they assume the content of the law reflects their 
pre-existing social, cultural, and moral norms.  And so, the reason many peo-
ple falsely believe specific performance is the remedy for breach may be that 
they assume contract law reflects commonsense promissory morality.  They 
infer what we can call “folk legality” from their “folk morality.”167  That in-
ference often misfires, perhaps particularly frequently in private law.168  But 
it would, nonetheless, be difficult to argue that laypeople are unreasonable to 
assume the content of law reflects the content of morality.  And, it would be 
particularly odd for an autonomy theorist like Fried to make that argument: 
A central aspect of the moral force of contract as promise is precisely the fact 
                                                          
 165.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 166.  This argument has less purchase regarding, for example, false beliefs about the mailbox 
rule.  But note the dynamic between the accessibility of legal knowledge and the number of cases 
which will be afflicted by legal ignorance: Part of the reason the mailbox rule is difficult to know is 
because it affects so few cases in practice.  As a result, the aspects of legal ignorance that pose the 
greatest threat to the autonomy theory by affecting the most cases are precisely those aspects that 
concern contract doctrines that are easiest for laypeople to know. 
 167.  “Folk morality” (or “folk moral theory”) is a widely discussed notion in the philosophical 
literature referring to the moral beliefs most people, untrained in moral philosophy, hold.  See, e.g., 
Frank Jackson & Phillip Pettit, Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation, 45 PHIL. QUARTERLY 
20, 24 (1995).  The phrase “folk legality” is my own and refers to the legal analogue of folk moral-
ity—the legal beliefs that most people, untrained in the law, hold. 
 168.  Inferring the content of criminal law from folk morality will often be reliable, especially 
with respect to malum in se crimes, like murder or physical assault, that are crimes precisely because 
they are morally wrong.  But, as many legal scholars noted, many aspects of private law diverge 
from folk morality.  See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 15. 
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that, on his view, contract law does reflect morality.169  To avoid the bite of 
this problem, the autonomy theorist would have to argue that contract doc-
trine should (and often does) reflect the commonsense morality of promising, 
but where contract doctrine diverges from promissory morality, people are 
unreasonable in failing to recognize the exception.  That, I think, is an unrea-
sonable standard to hold people to. 
The upshot, then, is people are often reasonable in their false beliefs 
about contract doctrine because it is reasonable for them to think the content 
of law reflects commonsense morality.  Because those false beliefs are rea-
sonable, they are not at fault for holding them.  Accordingly, it would be 
morally improper to hold people to contracts based on that mistake.  Apply-
ing the contemporary doctrine of mistake, understood in a way that reflects 
the autonomy theory of contract, that conclusion likely entails that contracts 
are voidable whenever people reasonably have false beliefs about the remedy 
for breach. 
The question remains what to do in response to that radical conclusion.  
One response for the autonomy theorists would be to bite the bullet and con-
cede that their view, combined with the phenomenon of pervasive false be-
liefs about contract doctrine, entails that vast numbers of contracts are void-
able.  That radical implication would render the commercial system based on 
ubiquitous contracting unacceptably unstable.  Commercial parties would 
have no way of knowing whether their counterparty could later void their 
contract, introducing intolerable uncertainty into ordinary contracting situa-
tions.  They could do their best to put their counterparties on notice of the 
remedy for breach, but experience shows that attempts at disclosure have 
modest effect.170  Moreover, courts would have limited ability to determine 
ex post whether a contracting party really did believe the remedy was specific 
performance.  Especially in larger transactions, that problem invites strategic 
behavior by unscrupulous parties seeking to escape an onerous contract 
through feigned ignorance.  The result of the autonomy theorist following 
their principle to its conclusion would thus be an unworkable system of con-
tract law. 
The alternative approach for the autonomy theorist is to concede that the 
theory cannot serve as the normative foundation for a workable system of 
contract law in a world beset by legal ignorance and mistake.  That is not to 
say the theory was normatively flawed from the outset.  Nor is it to say au-
tonomy considerations have no role to play in the crafting of contract doc-
trine.  But it does mean the autonomy theorist would have to rely on a second-
best normative theory to serve as the principal foundation for contract law. 
                                                          
 169.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 17.  
 170.  See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: 
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 14–32 (2014). 
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B.  Implications for Contract Doctrine 
That move—the autonomy theorist shifting to what is, on their view, a 
second-best normative theory—might provide an opportunity to make pro-
gress in longstanding doctrinal disputes, the resolution of which ultimately 
depends on which foundational normative theory we accept.  Since the dawn 
of the common law of contracts, cases have involved a tension between prom-
issory or consent-based normative justifications for particular doctrinal rules 
and opposing normative justifications that support opposing doctrinal 
rules.171  That opposing normative foundation is, but not always, economic 
efficiency.  Sometimes the opposing norm is instead fairness to a disadvan-
taged party, distributional considerations, or something else.  In such doctri-
nal disputes, a court must decide whether to adopt a rule supported by a prom-
issory or consent-based rationale or a different rule supported by some other 
normative rationale, like efficiency.  Perhaps the most prominent example of 
such a dispute is about the default remedy for breach: A promissory rationale 
seems (at least to many, like Shiffrin) to entail that specific performance 
should be the remedy, whereas many courts and scholars agree that an effi-
ciency rationale supports the expectation remedy.172  Other examples of such 
doctrinal questions abound: whether a non-breaching party has a duty to mit-
igate the harm caused by a breach;173 whether punitive damages should be 
available for willful breaches;174 whether the law should require considera-
tion to make a contract enforceable;175 whether excess liquidated damages 
                                                          
 171.  See generally Shiffrin, supra note 15. 
 172.  Compare Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 722 (“Absent the consent of the promisee, the moral 
requirement would not be satisfied if the promisor merely supplied the financial equivalent of what 
was promised.”), with RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 133 (9th ed. 2014) (ex-
plaining that expectation remedy is efficient), and Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing 
Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980) (same), and Lewis 
A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 683 (1986) (same). 
 173.  Compare Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 724 (“Contract law requires the promisee to mitigate 
her damages. . . . As a general rule, [promissory] morality does not impose such requirements on 
disappointed promisees.”), with Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1359 (2009) (proffering an anti-monopolistic economic rationale for the duty 
to mitigate). 
 174.  Compare Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 723 (“[I]ntentional promissory breach is not subject to 
punitive damages, that is, to those legal damages that express the judgment that the behavior repre-
sents a wrong.”), with POSNER, supra note 172, at 140 (opposing punitive damages for breach on 
the ground that “penalty would deter efficient . . . breaches by making the cost of the breach to the 
contract breaker greater than the cost of the breach to the victim”). 
 175.  See FRIED, supra note 15, at 37–39 (doubting that the doctrine of consideration is grounded 
in promissory morality); Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 728, 736–37 (same). 
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should be invalidated as penalty clauses;176 whether subjective or objective 
assent and meanings should govern;177 and so on. 
One constant in those doctrinal disputes is that the choice of legal rule 
typically turns on the choice of underlying normative theory.  If one is com-
mitted to a pure promissory theory of contract, then it might follow that the 
proper legal remedy for breach is specific performance because it enforces a 
promise.178  By contrast, if one is a law and economics theorist, then it might 
follow that the proper legal remedy for breach is expectation damages be-
cause it yields efficient outcomes.179  The choice of contract remedy thus 
depends on the choice between adopting promissory morality or consequen-
tialism as one’s underlying normative theory.  But neither courts nor legal 
scholars typically provide a reason—or at least, not an ultimately persuasive 
reason—to choose one or the other foundational normative theory in the first 
place.  It is, instead, simply a matter of choosing different first principles 
from which to begin.180  As a result, though contract doctrine may have 
trended in one direction or another, the absence of an ultimate rationale for 
why we should choose a legal rule on the basis of efficiency rather than prom-
issory morality (or vice versa) yielded a debate with no final answer.  Judges 
or scholars who begin with a different normative theory could simply say 
(although, it is typically left unsaid) the doctrinal rule with which they disa-
gree was based on the wrong moral premises and so should be reformed. 
This Article’s conclusion may provide some traction in the debate that 
was previously elusive.  The error theory of contract, and its implications for 
the viability of an autonomy theory, might offer an alternative way to adju-
dicate that fundamental normative dispute in the context of the choice of doc-
trinal rules for the class of cases to which it applies.  The error theory entailed 
that, among the domain of cases in which one of the parties has false beliefs 
about the default remedy for breach, the autonomy theory cannot justify or-
thodox contract doctrine because that set of people did not promise or consent 
to the bargain to which contract doctrine holds them.  If an autonomy theory 
grounded in promise or consent cannot support a workable legal system of 
                                                          
 176.  See Kraus, supra note 15, at 1635 n.63 (“[C]ontract law’s refusal to enforce an express 
penalty damages clause (in excess of expectation damages) clearly fails to enforce the parties’ moral 
obligations.”). 
 177.  See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 16, at 723 (“Fried’s [promise] theory clearly requires that con-
tractual obligation be based on shared subjective intentions, and therefore rejects the objective the-
ory of contract because it imposes contractual liability in the absence of such intentions.”). 
 178.  See Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 722. 
 179.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 172, at 133. 
 180.  Adjudicating the dispute between foundational normative theories is the province of phi-
losophers.  If a philosopher offered a definitive—or even sufficiently compelling—argument that, 
say, Kantian moral theory is correct and consequentialism is misguided, then that philosophical 
result would have profound downstream implications for the law.  But philosophers have not yet 
settled those disputes among themselves. 
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contract for the range of parties within the domain of the error theory’s con-
clusion, then even those committed to an autonomy theory as a first-best nor-
mative foundation for contract law may have to look to other norms.  In other 
words, an autonomy theorist who recognizes that their primary normative 
principle cannot ground a workable system of contract and, therefore, cannot 
answer which doctrinal rules that workable system should adopt, may instead 
look to a different, second-best norm like efficiency or fairness to provide 
answers.  The implication is that we may, at least in some cases, be able to 
adjudicate the doctrinal disputes that arose from fundamental disagreements 
about foundational normative theories without needing to resolve the under-
lying foundational normative dispute itself.  Accordingly, we may be able to 
conclude, for example, that a non-breaching layperson ought to have a legal 
duty to mitigate their harm—because the autonomy theory that might conflict 
with that doctrinal rule could not justify the application of contract doctrine 
to them anyway, we instead look to a second-best norm, like efficiency, that 
supports the rule. 
C.  Implications for Boilerplate 
Finally, the phenomenon of false beliefs and legal ignorance about the 
background rules of contract may have important and unexpected implica-
tions for the proper response to the problem of boilerplate.  Courts and schol-
ars have long seen boilerplate terms, buried in the fine print of contracts of 
adhesion, as problematic.181  They offered several different accounts of the 
source and nature of the problem of boilerplate: people’s ignorance of the 
content of those terms, which vitiates consent; the substantive unfairness of 
those terms, which are typically heavily slanted in favor of the drafting party; 
and the unilateral and potentially coercive replacement of democratically en-
acted law by the more powerful contracting party.182  These problems are 
related.  People’s ignorance of unfair boilerplate terms facilitates their inclu-
sion in form contracts because the disciplining function of competitive mar-
kets is impaired when purchasers do not know the relevant terms of the con-
tract.183  And, we have no quarrel with parties electing to override certain 
background, democratically-enacted default rules as long as both parties 
know what they are doing and do so freely; the democratic problem with 
boilerplate is that such knowledge and consent are lacking.184 
                                                          
 181.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 70, at 24; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632–33 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1174–76 (1983). 
 182.  See generally RADIN, supra note 70. 
 183.  See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND 
PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012). 
 184.  Contract law limits parties’ ability to override certain terms through its mandatory rules, 
like the rules governing formation and the rules of unconscionability doctrine.  The point, however, 
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Accordingly, the core of the problem, as Professor Margaret Jane Radin 
put it, is “sheer ignorance.”185  If people do not know the content of boiler-
plate terms—indeed, if they do not know those terms even exist in the fine 
print—then they cannot and do not consent to those terms.  Or more precisely, 
perhaps, the degree to which people consent to boilerplate terms is only that 
minimal sense that arises from clicking “I accept” on a pop-up window with 
terms of service that they do not read.  And so, in addition to the subtler 
problems Radin identified about the replacement of democratically-enacted 
law with unilaterally-imposed terms,186 the inclusion of unknown boilerplate 
terms represents the “devolution or decay of the concept of voluntariness.”187  
Radin followed the autonomy theory of contract to its ultimate conclusion 
about boilerplate: If people do not consent to boilerplate terms, those terms 
should be legally unenforceable.188 
The phenomenon of legal ignorance show that Radin and others who 
share her autonomy-based aversion to boilerplate have actually underesti-
mated the scope of the problem they identified.  If people are also ignorant 
of background legal default rules, like the law’s preference for expectation 
damages over specific performance, then they consented to the legally-im-
plied, implicit remedy term in a non-boilerplate contract no more than they 
consented to a boilerplate remedy clause.189  Indeed, at least with boilerplate 
terms people click “I accept” and are put on notice that they are formally 
assenting to a long list of terms, the substance of which they know they are 
ignorant.  That thin form of consent is, for the reasons Radin offered, norma-
tively impoverished relative to the ideal of informed consent we demand in 
                                                          
is that the justification for allowing the parties to alter background rules where the law permits is 
frequently absent in boilerplate cases. 
 185.  RADIN, supra note 70, at 21. 
 186.  Id. at 24. 
 187.  Id. at 30. 
 188.  Id. at 213 (arguing that boilerplate terms “should be declared invalid in toto, and recipients 
should instead be governed by the background legal default rules”).  Radin also proposed the crea-
tion of an intentional tort of the “deprivation of basic legal rights” to discourage boilerplate-drafting 
parties from engaging in the practice.  Id. at 211.  
 189.  This problem is related to one identified by Omri Ben-Shahar.  See Omri Ben-Shahar, Reg-
ulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 887 (2014) (“Rather than pro-
vided and summarized by one party in a term sheet, however, the legal matter of the [non-boiler-
plate] contract is provided by other legal sources: default rules and gap fillers, local customs and 
market norms, and an intense fabric of regulations governing the trade of that particular good.”).  
Ben-Shahar characterized the problem as primarily one of “complexity”—background legal rules, 
including both gap-filling default rules and the social customs and commercial customs against 
which contracts are formed are, in his view, just as difficult to understand as boilerplate.  Id. at 888–
89.  The pervasiveness of legal ignorance shows that the problem is sharper than Ben-Shahar sug-
gested: It is not just that the background law is complex, difficult to understand, and in some in-
stances (like the magnitude of expectation damages) even difficult to predict ex ante; rather, it is 
that many people have affirmatively false beliefs about the core question of what remedy the law 
provides for breach, which vitiates consent in a much more direct way. 
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other contexts, like medical procedures.190  But it is more consent than we 
can see with respect to background legal rules about which people have af-
firmatively false beliefs.191  The upshot is that Radin’s proposed solution—
making boilerplate unenforceable to clear the way for the application of back-
ground legal rules—does not solve the problem so much as moves it: What 
was a lack of informed consent to boilerplate becomes a lack of informed 
consent to background legal rules.  And so, from the perspective of a prom-
ise- or consent-based autonomy theory of contract, her proposed solution 
does not improve matters and may even make them worse. 
The better solution to the problem of boilerplate may instead be an un-
expected one: Instead of banning boilerplate, the law should require it and 
regulate it.  Radin and other opponents of boilerplate, I just argued, cannot 
justify a preference for the application of background law on the basis of 
promise or consent because it is lacking in either case.  The remaining prob-
lem with boilerplate—and it is a profound problem—is that the content of 
much boilerplate is intolerably unfair in substance.  It deprives people of legal 
rights (like data privacy rights through waiver clauses) and legal remedies 
(like access to courts through arbitration clauses) in ways that are unfair and 
harm both the parties to those boilerplate contracts and society more 
broadly.192  But the normative basis of that intolerability is not, ultimately, 
just the lack of promise or consent.  Consider an arbitration clause that limits 
a person’s access to court and prohibits them from proceeding as a class.  
What is worse about that clause, relative to the background law of contract, 
is not consent: People may not have consented to the arbitration clause be-
cause they did not know it existed, but many also did not consent to expecta-
tion damages because they falsely believed the remedy at law is specific per-
formance.  Rather, what is worse about the arbitration clause is that it is less 
fair, harms people by reducing their access to justice, and is quite possibly 
economically inefficient because it allows businesses to sell defective prod-
ucts at inflated prices without facing the real prospect of liability.193  On each 
                                                          
 190.  RADIN, supra note 70, at 89. 
 191.  Radin’s other argument—that boilerplate replaces democratically-enacted legal regimes 
with unilaterally-imposed terms—may appear to undermine this point.  See RADIN, supra note 70, 
at 24.  Even if people do not consent to the background legal rules in the narrow context of a par-
ticular contract, they at least, in a broader sense, participate in a democratic process that resulted in 
those legal rules while, in contrast, they participate not at all in the drafting of contracts of adhesion.  
So those legal rules may have a consent-like legitimacy after all.  But if people are ignorant of the 
legal rules, and especially if those legal rules conflict with their commonsense notions of moral right 
and wrong, then the democratic process is malfunctioning in a way that prevents it from conferring 
the sort of legitimacy on contract doctrine that can substitute for consent.  In that respect, people are 
hoodwinked by courts and legislatures, who impose default rules and thus implied contract terms 
that people do not know, just as much as the drafters of boilerplate are hoodwinking them. 
 192.  See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 70, at 183 (referring to “mandatory arbitration clauses” as 
“mass-market [remedy] deletion schemes”). 
 193.  Id. 
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of those measures, expectation damages (and class litigation) is superior to 
individual arbitration.194  But none of those measures is promise or consent. 
The best approach, in a world beset by legal ignorance, may, therefore, 
be to require boilerplate terms whose content is regulated according to non-
promissory or consent-based norms, including efficiency, fairness, and so on.  
From the perspective of promise or consent, it ultimately does not matter 
whether background law or boilerplate provide a given set of legal rules be-
cause many people are ignorant of both.195  If anything, the thin notion of 
promise or consent that arises from the formal assent of acceding to boiler-
plate (that is, from clicking “I accept”) is more than most people give towards 
the background rules of contract law.196  And, it may be better to provide a 
given set of legal rules in boilerplate than it would be to have no explicit 
terms on the issue and provide the exact same legal rules only in background 
law. 
People sometimes use contracts as reference documents, after the fact, 
to determine their legal rights when a problem arises.197  As long as the text 
of the contract provides accurate legal information, that method of acquiring 
legal knowledge is significantly more accessible to most people than consult-
ing statutes, cases, and regulations.  And, it would not require hiring a lawyer, 
a step that exceeds the means of many.  As a result, in those cases where 
people consult their contracts to determine their legal rights,198 people may 
be better equipped to vindicate those legal rights if the text of the contract 
itself provides that information. The best legal rule, on the basis of efficiency 
and fairness, may well ultimately be to prohibit arbitration clauses.  But there 
is little to gain, and potentially much to lose, by requiring background law to 
provide the best legal rule rather than in the adequately regulated text of con-
tract boilerplate. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article’s central normative conclusion is that promise- or consent-
based autonomy theories of contract cannot justify existing contract doctrine 
in light of pervasive and heterogeneous false beliefs and legal ignorance 
                                                          
 194.  See, e.g., id.; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise 
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005). 
 195.  See Bakos et al., supra note 70, at 2; see also supra Section I.C. 
 196.  Moreover, once the law adequately regulates the substance of contract boilerplate, that 
boilerplate gains a measure of democratic legitimacy because the regulation ensures that boilerplate 
terms must fall within a range the legislature or agency determined is, for example, fair.  Radin’s 
preference for background law over boilerplate on democratic grounds would thus lose its bite. 
 197.  See supra text accompanying note 71–72 (presenting results of a survey indicating that 
most people consult their residential leases to determine their legal rights after a problem arises with 
their apartment). 
 198.  See supra Section I.B. 
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about that doctrine.  If the Article’s argument is right, then the natural alter-
native is to do what we can to prompt people to revise their false beliefs.  That 
strategy is appealing, but it likely lies outside our grasp.  In light of the deeply 
entrenched social, cultural, and moral norms that inform folk legality, there 
is little hope that lawmakers or courts could take any step to cure pervasive 
false beliefs and legal ignorance about contract doctrine.  At best, we might 
hope for modest improvement in the accuracy of laypeople’s beliefs about 
contract law.  Nor can we revise contract doctrine to conform to their existing 
beliefs about contract law.  People’s beliefs about contract law are heteroge-
neous,199 so many will have false beliefs about the law no matter which legal 
rules we adopt. 
The remaining alternative for contract theorists to adopt a different, vi-
able justificatory theory for contract law, a strategy outlined in Section III.A.  
Then, we must explore what doctrinal reforms such a theory entails.  That 
task is challenging for law and economics theories of contract, but it finds a 
useful model in behavioral law and economics’ analyses of bounded ration-
ality.200  That project seeks to determine which legal rules—for example, 
which default rules of contract—are efficient in light of pervasive human er-
rors of rationality.  One such error, for example, is an optimism bias that leads 
people to discount the probability of bad outcomes.  That sort of cognitive 
error can lead to inefficiency because “[s]ophisticated sellers facing imper-
fectly rational consumers will seek to reduce the perceived total price of their 
products without reducing the actual total price that consumers pay . . . by 
back-loading costs onto long-term price dimensions” in ways that ultimately 
reduce welfare.201  The behavioral law and economists’ solution to the inef-
ficiencies introduced by bounded rationality is to “debias”—that is, to craft 
legal rules in such a way that accounts for and counteracts humans’ imperfect 
rationality.202  Similarly, a law and economics theory of contract can seek to 
“debias” the law to account for people’s pervasive false beliefs and legal ig-
norance about contract doctrine.  That project, whether it is founded on a 
consequentialist, law and economics foundation or some other normative the-
ory, is ripe for execution. 
The error theory of contract, and its implications for the viability of 
prominent justificatory accounts of contract doctrine, can also serve as a 
model for error theories of other areas of private law.  People’s knowledge 
of the law derives not from any careful attention to the case reporters or stat-
ute rolls.  Rather, when people know what the law is, it is usually because 
they assume the law reflects the social, cultural, and moral customs with 
                                                          
 199.  See supra Section I.C. 
 200.  See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
200 (2006). See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008). 
 201.  BAR-GILL, supra note 183, at 23, 23–26. 
 202.  See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 200, at 230. 
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which they are already familiar.  That inference—from non-legal norms to 
the content of the law—often (but not always) yields correct beliefs about 
criminal law203 but frequently leads people astray with respect to private law.  
As a result, there is reason to suspect that people may also have false beliefs 
about the law of bankruptcy, tort, corporations, and so on.  All of these doc-
trinal areas govern matters about which people likely have pre-existing so-
cial, cultural, and moral ideas.  Those false beliefs about other areas of private 
law in turn generate serious normative implications that warrant our atten-
tion.  This Article took the first step in that broader project by exploring the 
contours and implications of widespread error about contract law.  
                                                          
 203.  Even in the context of criminal law, the principle that ignorance of the law ordinarily does 
not excuse came under renewed criticism due to the expansion of criminal law’s prohibitions.  See, 
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of the Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 127, 129 (1997) (arguing for an “anti-Holmesian account” that seeks to explain “why igno-
rance of the law is not ordinarily regarded as an excuse” and “why it sometimes is”); Edwin Meese 
III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 725, 729 (2012) (“Legislatures and courts have made vast changes to the structure 
of the criminal justice system, to the officials who comprise that system, and to the procedures that 
govern how those actors play their roles.  Those developments may have greatly altered the land-
scape that gave rise to the common law mistake of law rule—so much so, in fact, that it might no 
longer make sense to follow the rule.”).   
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APPENDIX—STUDY TOOL FOR CONTRACT REMEDIES SURVEY 
First, each subject was randomly presented with one of the following 
two scenarios: 
PROFIT 
You decided to add a backyard deck to your house, and you hope to 
have it finished in time for the end of the summer.  You called Jones, who is 
a contractor specializing in building decks.  You and Jones signed a contract 
for him to build the deck by Labor Day weekend in exchange for $5,000, 
which you paid immediately.  When you signed the contract, you told Jones 
that in anticipation of using the deck over Labor Day weekend, you planned 
a family reunion and invited relatives from out of town who you haven’t seen 
in many years. 
After you and Jones signed the contract, however, another homeowner 
approached Jones and offered him much more money to build a deck for his 
house by Labor Day.  Jones did not have time to complete both jobs by Labor 
Day.  He told you that he decided he would build a deck for the other home-
owner and would not build the deck for you.  You sued Jones in court for 
breach of contract.  The court ruled in your favor. 
AVOID LOSS 
You decided to add a backyard deck to your house, and you hope to 
have it finished in time for the end of the summer.  You called Jones, who is 
a contractor specializing in building decks.  You and Jones signed a contract 
for him to build the deck by Labor Day weekend in exchange for $5,000, 
which you paid immediately.  When you signed the contract, you told Jones 
that in anticipation of using the deck over Labor Day weekend, you planned 
a family reunion and invited relatives from out of town who you haven’t seen 
in many years. 
After you and Jones signed the contract, however, the price of lumber 
materials increased significantly.  Because of the increase in costs, if Jones 
built the deck for you, he would lose money on the job.  After Jones learned 
of the increased cost of lumber, he told you that he would not build the deck. 
You sued Jones in court for breach of contract.  The court ruled in your favor. 
Then, all subjects were asked the following questions: 
(1)  When a court rules in favor of the plaintiff —that’s you, the party 
suing in court—it typically awards a “remedy” that orders the defendant to 
pay money or to do something.  Of the following two options, which remedy 
do you think the court will award to you in your case against Jones? 
a.  The court will order Jones to build the deck for you by Labor Day in 
exchange for the agreed-upon price. 
b.  The court will order Jones to refund your $5,000 and to pay you an 
additional amount of money to compensate for not having the deck in time 
for the family reunion. 
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(2)  How confident are you in your answer about which remedy the court 
will award you in your case against Jones? 
a.  Very confident. 
b.  Somewhat confident. 
c.  Slightly confident. 
d.  Not at all confident. 
(3)  In general, in breach of contract cases, what do you think the court 
would award the plaintiff if he or she wins? 
a.  The court would order the defendant to do what he/she agreed to do 
in the contract. 
b.  The court would order the defendant to pay monetary compensation 
to the plaintiff. 
(4)  How confident are you in your answer about which remedy the court 
typically awards a plaintiff in a breach of contract case? 
a.  Very confident. 
b.  Somewhat confident. 
c.  Slightly confident. 
d.  Not at all confident. 
For questions (1) and (3), the order of the options was randomized so 
half of the subjects saw a/b/a/b, and half saw b/a/b/a. 
